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Abstract
Rookie Market: Unpacking the Black Box of Firm-Worker Matching
Soumitra Shukla
2021
This dissertation consists of two chapters which study the job placement pro-
cesses of an elite technical college in India and a top U.S. business school. Using
detailed information on every step of job search, I explore the roles played by
workers and firms in determining labor market outcomes and assess policy in-
terventions to remedy disparities. I also quantify the salience of socio-emotional
skills, such as compassion, gregariousness, assertiveness etc., in explaining aca-
demic behavior, sorting patterns in the various steps of job search, and eventual
placement outcomes.
In the first chapter, I study the job placement process of an elite technical
college in India, half of which is comprised of students from the disadvantaged
castes. I evaluate the potential of policies to promote hiring diversity among pri-
vate sector jobs in India. To do so, I employ novel administrative data on all stages
of job search, including job applications, pre-interview screening tests, job inter-
views, job offers, and job choices. I first decompose the earnings drop off across
castes at each stage of job search and show that almost all of it occurs between
one-on-one interviews (third round) and job offers. Guided by the sequential de-
composition of the earnings gap, I build a model of the job placement process.
My estimates show that caste disparities in hiring are driven not by differential
caste-preferences over job characteristics but by hiring decisions of firms. Finally,
I evaluate counterfactual policies to promote hiring diversity. First, I consider a
subsidy in which firms are compensated by the amount that makes them indiffer-
ent between hiring an observably identical advantaged or disadvantaged caste.
Second, I consider a “pre-college intervention” policy which equalizes the distri-
bution of pre-college test scores across castes. Even under extremely conservative
assumptions, I show that direct subsidies can be twice as cost-effective as the “pre-
college intervention” policy in promoting hiring diversity.
In the second chapter, which is joint work with John Eric Humphries, we study
the job placement process of an elite MBA program in the U.S. and quantify the
role of socio-emotional skills in determining academic outcomes and eventual job
placements. Using detailed measures of socio-emotional traits taken before stu-
dents matriculate, we evaluate how such traits affects three types of outcomes:
academic performance and course choices, job search behavior, and industry and
compensation of the accepted job offer. Initial descriptive results show that socio-
emotional skills are predictive of behavior in each of these three areas, commonly
out-predicting the effects of standardized test scores. Moreover, the relative im-
portance of different skills varies across the three areas of outcomes considered.
Based on the descriptive evidence, we estimate a sequential model of the key
stages of the MBA program, including academic performance, course special-
ization, job search, and job placements. Using the model, we then decompose
the total effects of socio-emotional skills into direct returns and indirect returns
through differences in both academic performance and job search behavior. Initial
descriptive results suggest that gregariousness and industriousness are important
predictors of earnings upon graduation. However, they work through different
channels: industriousness affects academic performance while gregariousness af-
fects job search behavior.
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Introduction
The initial job placement of a college graduate plays a crucial role in his future
job mobility and career growth. Poor initial placements can lead to lasting im-
pediments by placing college graduates in jobs with limited room for training or
promotion (Kahn et al., 2014).
Many college graduates obtain their first jobs through career offices which act
as liaisons between students and employers. Job placement mechanisms pro-
posed by career offices often dictate how a college graduate obtains his first job.
Therefore, a detailed study of such job placement processes offers a unique win-
dow into the mechanisms which drive the sorting patterns in job search and, as a
consequence, have implications for a richer understanding of the initial determi-
nants of career trajectories and earnings growth.
My dissertation studies the job placement processes of a leading post-secondary
educational institution in India and a top U.S. business school. Job placement
processes typically include job applications, pre-interview screening tests, job in-
terviews, job offers and job choices. Using detailed information on each stage
of the job placement process, I explore the roles played by workers and firms in
determining labor market outcomes and assess policy interventions to remedy
disparities. By studying structured job placement processes, I also quantify the
1
salience of socio-emotional skills, such as compassion, gregariousness, assertive-
ness etc., in explaining academic behavior, sorting patterns in the various steps of
job search, and eventual placement outcomes.
In the first chapter, I study the job placement process of an elite technical col-
lege in India, half of which is comprised of students from disadvantaged groups
or disadvantaged castes. Disadvantaged castes earn 15% less than comparable
advantaged castes in India’s urban labor markets, with the largest disparities
concentrated in the private sector. Such disparities remain pronounced despite
widespread and effective affirmative action policies in college admissions. More-
over, there is no empirical evidence evaluating compensatory hiring practices for
disadvantaged castes among private sector jobs in India.
Using novel administrative data on all steps of job search, I evaluate policies
to promote hiring diversity. The administrative data includes rich student-level
information on all stages of job search, including job applications, pre-interview
screening tests, job interviews, job offers, and job choices. The data also includes
detailed information on pre-college test scores, previous labor market experience,
within-college performance, job characteristics and demographics.
I offer the first quantitative decomposition of the earnings drop off (across
castes) at each stage of job search. I show that the compositions of job applica-
tions and job choices do not explain the earnings gap. Pre-interview screening
tests including written aptitude tests (first round) and group discussion based
“soft skills” tests (second round) explain only a small fraction of the drop off in
earnings. Therefore, almost all of the earnings drop off occurs between one-on-one
interviews (third round) and job offers. These findings suggest that policies which
provide information about jobs, modify preferences, or improve performance at
university are unlikely to close the earnings gap.
2
Guided by the sequential decomposition of the earnings gap, I build a model
of the job placement process. The model, which incorporates both the supply of
and demand for jobs, is estimated using the method of simulated likelihood. My
estimates show that caste disparities in hiring are driven not by differential caste-
preferences over job characteristics but by hiring decisions of firms. Additionally,
modelled unobservables play an economically small role in jointly determining
observed choices. On average, firms need to be compensated 5% of average salary
to be as likely to make job offers to disadvantaged castes as to observably similar
advantaged castes.
Finally, I evaluate policies to promote hiring diversity. First, I consider a sub-
sidy in which firms are compensated by the amount that makes them indifferent
between hiring an observably identical advantaged or disadvantaged caste. Sec-
ond, I consider a “pre-college intervention” policy which equalizes the distribu-
tion of pre-college test scores across castes. To compare cost-effectiveness, I use
the model estimates and calculate the change in test scores required to induce the
same employment gains for the disadvantaged caste as the gains from the direct
subsidy. The change in test scores is large because the model estimates imply that
test scores play only a small role in hiring. Even under extremely conservative
assumptions, a back of the envelope calculation based on cost estimates of im-
proving student test scores in India shows that direct subsidies can be twice as
cost-effective as the “pre-college intervention” policy.
In the second chapter, which is joint work with John Eric Humphries, we study
the job placement process of an elite MBA program in the U.S. and quantify the
role of socio-emotional skills in determining academic outcomes and eventual job
placements. A large literature has documented the crucial role played by socio-
emotional skills in determining educational attainments and labor market out-
3
comes. However, little is known regarding the mechanisms through which non-
cognitive skills affect such outcomes.
Using detailed measures of socio-emotional traits taken before students ma-
triculate, this chapter evaluates how such traits affects three types of outcomes:
academic performance and course choices, job search behavior, and industry and
compensation of the accepted job offer. These personality measures, such as com-
passion, gregariousness, assertiveness etc., are assessed through forced-choice
methods which provide robust safeguards against “gaming”. Initial descriptive
results show that socio-emotional skills are predictive of behavior in each of these
three areas, commonly out-predicting the effects of standardized test scores. More-
over, the relative importance of different skills varies across the three areas of out-
comes considered. Based on the descriptive evidence, we estimate a sequential
model of the key stages of the MBA program, including academic performance,
course specialization, job search, and job placements. Using the model, we then
decompose the total effects of socio-emotional skills into direct returns and in-
direct returns through differences in both academic performance and job search
behavior. Preliminary descriptive results suggest that gregariousness and indus-
triousness are important predictors of earnings upon graduation. However, they
work through different channels: industriousness affects academic performance
while gregariousness affects job search behavior.
My dissertation also opens up many avenues for further research. For exam-
ple, one could ask what the optimal job placement mechanism would be. Theo-
retical first-best mechanisms may not be well-suited for distributional welfare (or,
equity). However, ad-hoc job placement processes might sacrifice substantial ag-
gregate welfare (or, efficiency) for modest improvements in distributional welfare.
An ideal job placement process would balance both distributional and aggregate
4
welfare of participants. Another study could involve quantifying the inefficien-
cies (if, any) due to early matching or unraveling. In one of the job placement pro-
cesses I study, students cannot participate in job interviews scheduled on the next
interview day conditional on receiving job offers from firms interviewing them
on the current interview day. However, it is not obvious if such a job placement
process is sub-optimal, especially if the job placement process has distributional
goals. While theoretical works positing the inefficiencies of unraveling in labor
markets have been large, they have been so far accompanied by a very slim body




Between College and That First Job: Designing and
Evaluating Policies for Hiring Diversity
Abstract
In India’s urban labor markets, disadvantaged castes earn 15% less than compa-
rable advantaged castes, with the largest disparities concentrated in the private
sector. Such disparities remain pronounced despite widespread and effective af-
firmative action policies in college admissions. Moreover, there is no empirical
evidence evaluating compensatory hiring practices for disadvantaged castes in
the private sector. This paper studies policies to promote hiring diversity. To do
so, I employ novel data on every stage of the job placement process of an elite
technical college in India, half of which is comprised of students from disadvan-
taged castes. The administrative data includes rich student-level information on
all stages of job search, including job applications, pre-interview screening tests,
job interviews, job offers, and job choices. I offer the first quantitative decompo-
sition of the earnings drop off (across castes) at each stage of the job placement
process. I show that the compositions of job applications and job choices do not
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explain the earnings gap. Pre-interview screening tests including written aptitude
tests (first round) and group discussion based ”soft skills” tests (second round) ex-
plain only a small fraction of the drop off in earnings. Therefore, almost all of the
earnings drop off occurs between one-on-one interviews (third round) and job of-
fers. These findings suggest that policies which provide information about jobs,
modify preferences, or improve performance at university are unlikely to close
the earnings gap. Guided by the sequential decomposition of the earnings gap, I
build a model of the job placement process. The model, which incorporates both
the supply of and demand for jobs, is estimated using the method of simulated
likelihood. My estimates show that caste disparities in hiring are driven not by
differential caste-preferences over job characteristics but by hiring decisions of
firms. Additionally, modelled unobservables play an economically small role in
jointly determining observed choices. Finally, I evaluate policies to promote hir-
ing diversity. First, I consider a subsidy in which firms are compensated by the
amount that makes them indifferent between hiring an observably identical ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged caste. Second, I consider a “pre-college intervention”
policy which equalizes the distribution of pre-college test scores across castes. To
compare cost-effectiveness, I use the model estimates and calculate the change
in test scores required to induce the same employment gains for the disadvan-
taged caste as those under the direct subsidy. The change in test scores is large
because the model estimates imply that test scores play only a small role in hiring.
Even under extremely conservative assumptions, a back of the envelope calcula-
tion based on cost estimates of improving student test scores in India shows that




In India’s urban labor markets, disadvantaged castes earn 15% less than compa-
rable advantaged castes, with the largest disparities concentrated in the private
sector (Madheswaran and Attewell, 2007). Caste disparities in the Indian private
sector remain pronounced despite widespread and effective affirmative action
policies in college admissions. Yet, there is no evidence comparing the relative
performances of compensatory hiring practices for disadvantaged castes in the
private sector. Workplace caste disparities arise as early as in the first jobs taken
by college graduates. Poor initial placements can lead to lasting impediments
by placing college graduates in jobs with limited room for training or promotion
(Kahn et al., 2014).
Current policy proposals to mitigate caste disparities in hiring lack formal ev-
idence. Some argue that reducing gaps in pre-college skills between advantaged
and disadvantaged castes is paramount (Bagde et al., 2016; Newman and Thorat,
2010). Improving student test scores has also been one of the primary goals of
numerous pre-college interventions in the developing world (McEwan, 2015). In
contrast, others argue that imposing hiring quotas or making discriminatory hir-
ing illegal would have larger and more long-lasting effects (Madheswaran, 2008;
Verma, 2012).1 In addition to reserving a share of jobs for disadvantaged castes,
incentive-based measures linked to the Ministry of Minority Affairs’ Diversity In-
dex have been proposed as long-term solutions to reduce caste disparities in the
workplace (Kundu, 2008; Sachar Committee, 2006).2 However, there is no evi-
1Unlike the U.S., India does not have an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Office.
2The Diversity Index quantifies the employment distribution of occupations by caste, gender
and religion.
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dence comparing the potential of such policies in reducing workplace caste dis-
parities. The Indian private sector employs more than 90% of all college gradu-
ates. Hence, comparing the relative efficacy of policies to reduce caste disparities
in the private sector is essential.
Most college graduates in India navigate the job search process through career
offices which act as liaisons between students and employers. Some career offices
also collect information on job applications, pre-interview screening tests, job in-
terviews, job offers and job choices. Detailed information on each stage of the job
placement process allows for a better understanding not only of the roles played
by workers and firms in determining labor market outcomes but also of suitable
channels for policy interventions to remedy potential disparities.
This paper models the job placement process of a leading post-secondary ed-
ucational institution in India and studies policies to promote hiring diversity. In
doing so, I make three main contributions. First, I quantify the earnings drop
off across castes at each stage of job search, which includes job applications, pre-
interview screening tests, job interviews, job offers and job choices. In particular,
I show that the compositions of job applications and job choices by students do
not explain the gaps in earnings across castes. Furthermore, using data on out-
comes from pre-interview screening tests and job interviews conducted by firms,
I show that almost all of the earnings drop off across castes occurs between job
interviews and job offers. These findings suggest that policies which provide in-
formation about jobs, modify preferences, or improve performance at university
are unlikely to close the earnings gap. Second, guided by the sequential decom-
position of the earnings gap, I build a model of the job placement process. The
model is of general interest and can serve as a prototype for studies of the place-
ment processes of engineering colleges, business schools, law schools, and other
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institutions that use formal job placement mechanisms. Third, I compare policies
to promote hiring diversity.
I now describe the main results. I first document large gaps in earnings and
job assignments across castes. I find that disadvantaged castes earn, on average,
11% less than comparable advantaged castes. There are no within-firm differ-
ences in pay by caste. So, the earnings gap arises due to differences in composi-
tions of job offers across castes. Disparities in earnings and job assignments are
most pronounced in the consulting sector and in client facing jobs. These find-
ings are consistent with a Beckerian framework of labor market sorting in which
job assignments are driven in part by the affinity of clients in some sectors, like
consulting, to work with advantaged castes (Becker, 1971).
To better understand the mechanisms driving the earnings differentials, I also
quantify the drop off in earnings at successive stages of the job placement pro-
cess. For this purpose, I use data on job applications, pre-interview screening
tests, job interviews, job offers and job choices. I show that the compositions of
job applications and job choices do not explain the earnings gap. Pre-interview
screening tests including written aptitude tests (first round) and group discussion
based ”soft skills” tests (second round) explain only a small fraction of the drop
off in earnings. Therefore, almost all of the earnings drop off occurs between one-
on-one interviews (third round) and job offers. Once job applications have been
submitted, pre-interview screening tests with written and verbal components ac-
count for 14% of the earnings gap. The remaining 86% of the earnings gap is
concentrated between job interviews and job offers. These gaps persist despite
detailed controls on pre-college skills, within-college academic performance and
previous labor market experience.
Guided by the sequential decomposition of the earnings gap, I build a model
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of the job placement process and study policies to promote hiring diversity. In
particular, I build a model of job hiring and job choices. In the model, firms eval-
uate student characteristics and make job offers subject to bounds on their hiring
size. Once job offers have been made, students make job choices by evaluating job
characteristics, which include salaries and non-pecuniary amenities. I estimate the
model and recover the “caste penalty” imposed by firms on disadvantaged castes.
Using the model, I compare the relative efficacy of two counterfactual policies in
promoting caste diversity in hiring.
The model bounds job placements of disadvantaged castes and job displace-
ments of advantaged castes under both counterfactual policies. In the model,
firms follow cutoff hiring rules which are allowed to adjust in response to counter-
factual hiring policies. The model adapts the toolkit of related studies on college
admissions and school choice to study something new: a job market. In contrast to
models in similar studies, allowing firms to adjust cutoff hiring rules in my model
leads to bounds on counterfactual outcomes. The bounds depend upon the elas-
ticity of supply of job slots. When the supply of job slots is perfectly elastic, firms
do not adjust cutoffs and can hire everyone who qualifies. However, when the
supply of job slots is perfectly inelastic, firms adjust cutoffs to hire the same total
number of students. Under both counterfactual policies, relative to the baseline,
disadvantaged castes are higher “skilled”. Therefore, when cutoffs do not adjust,
the number of disadvantaged caste hires is at least as large as when cutoffs in-
crease to hire the same total number of students. Displacements of advantaged
castes from jobs are bounded similarly.
The model also captures aspects most salient to the growing deliberations
on advancing compensatory hiring practices for disadvantaged castes: advance-
ment into and displacement from jobs. Concerns regarding potentially large dis-
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placements of advantaged castes have been major barriers in advancing com-
pensatory hiring practices for disadvantaged castes in the Indian private sector
(Verma, 2012). Hence, evaluating the aggregate and distributional consequences
of affirmative action policies in hiring is essential.
As an intermediate step toward evaluating counterfactual policies, I assign
dollar amounts to non-pecuniary characteristics which enter the utility functions
of students and firms. First, I quantify the “caste penalty” imposed by firms on
disadvantaged castes. I find that firms need to be compensated 4.8% of average
salary ($2721) to remain indifferent between hiring an observably identical ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged caste. Next, I quantify the value of non-pecuniary
amenities in the utility functions of students. For example, all things equal, stu-
dents need to be compensated 5.1% of average salary ($2909) for jobs which of-
fer stock options and 6.5% of average salary ($3683) for jobs which offer signing
bonuses. In contrast with the literature documenting differences between groups
(especially, between gender) in preferences over job characteristics (Altonji and
Blank, 1999; Buser et al., 2014; Eriksson and Kristensen, 2014; Goldin, 2018; Mas
and Pallais, 2017; Zafar and Wiswall, 2018), I find no differences between castes
in preferences over job characteristics. In my institutional setting, differences be-
tween castes in preferences over job characteristics do not explain caste dispari-
ties in earnings and job assignments. I also find that, conditional on observables,
econometrician-unobservables play only modest roles in determining both job hir-
ing and job choices.
Using the model estimates, I compare the reductions in workplace caste dis-
parities from two counterfactual hiring policies. In the first policy, I subsidize
firms by the cash-equivalent amount that makes them indifferent between hir-
ing an observably identical advantaged or disadvantaged caste. In the second
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policy, I equalize the distribution of pre-college skills (college entrance exam test
scores) across castes. Direct cash-subsides to employers to hire more disadvan-
taged castes are worth 4.8% of average salary ($2721). In contrast, the subsidy-
equivalent for employers of a policy which equalizes the distribution of college
entrance exam scores across castes is only 0.6% of average salary ($337). Therefore,
employer cash-subsidies increase job assignments and earnings of disadvantaged
by substantially more than the “pre-college intervention” policy.
I also perform back of the envelope calculations to compare the cost effective-
ness of both policies. In particular, I calculate the cost of improving college en-
trance exam scores to achieve changes in job assignments and earnings of disad-
vantaged castes equivalent to those induced by direct cash subsidies to employers.
For this purpose, I use estimates from a meta-analysis which evaluated the effects
of pre-college intervention programs spanning nearly two decades on test scores
of primary and secondary school students in India (Asim et al., 2015). Even under
extremely conservative assumptions, my calculations show that cash subsidies
to employers are twice as cost effective as the “pre-college intervention” policy.
The lower cost-effectiveness of the “pre-college intervention” policy is primarily
driven by the modest effects of test scores on hiring.
The paper contributes to several strands of the economics literature, especially
in labor economics. The paper presents unique descriptive facts on the decompo-
sition of earnings differentials. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to docu-
ment drop off in earnings at successive stages of job search. Determining the role
of different stages of job search in explaining the earnings gap is a crucial step in
understanding effective policy responses to redress disparities (in this case, across
castes). For example, if students apply to almost all jobs, the lack of variation in
job applications implies that policies aimed at inducing changes in job application
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behavior would not mitigate workplace caste disparities. If firm hiring exclusively
explains caste disparities, policy responses which directly incentivize firms to hire
more disadvantaged castes will be more effective in improving both earnings and
job assignments of disadvantaged castes.
My policy proposals incentivizing firms to hire more disadvantaged castes
help evaluate the redistributive impacts of affirmative action policies in hiring.
Ambiguity regarding the distributional effects of such policies has been a primary
driver behind India’s decision to exclude almost all of the private sector from de-
lineating compensatory hiring practices for disadvantaged castes (Madheswaran,
2008). Assessing the redistributive effects of affirmative action policies in hiring
would facilitate in championing their expansion to previously secluded avenues.
The paper also contributes to the personnel economics literature. To my knowl-
edge, this is the first paper to study a formal job placement mechanism. My struc-
tural model of the job placement process can also serve as a prototype for studies
of the placement processes used by engineering schools, business schools, law
schools, and other institutions that use formal job placement mechanisms. Job
placement processes proposed by career offices often dictate how a college gradu-
ate obtains his first job. Evaluating the aggregate and distributional consequences
of such job placement processes is, therefore, an important step in understanding
how the education and talent of individuals is linked to the types of jobs they
obtain early in their careers, and their overall labor market success.
Finally, the paper adds to the growing, but relatively thin, empirical literature
on quantifying preferences for non-pecuniary amenities in the workplace. Exper-
imental studies based on surveys are less informative than observed choices in
an actual job market. Differences in willingness-to-pay for non-pecuniary ameni-
ties might also explain differences in occupational choices, lifetime earnings, and
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even human capital investments as workers prepare to enter professions compat-
ible with their multi-faceted preferences for jobs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief overview of the
origin of caste-based affirmative action policies in India. Section 1.3 describes
the setting and the data. Section 1.4 establishes key descriptive facts. Section 1.5
describes the model. Section 1.6 discusses identification and estimation. Section
1.7 discusses parameter estimates. Section 1.8 evaluates counterfactuals. Section
1.9 concludes.
1.2 Caste and Affirmative Action in India
This section provides a brief overview of the origin of caste-based affirmative ac-
tion policies in India.
In 1914, when India was still under British rule, the Madras Legislative Coun-
cil deliberated upon the communal representation of registered students in the
University of Madras. Out of a total of 650 students enrolled in the university,
452 were Brahmin and 12 were non-Brahmin Hindus. However, only 74 students
belonged to the non-advantaged communities (Bayly, 2008). The deliberations of
the Madras Legislative Council paved the way for compensatory practices for dis-
advantaged groups, which over several decades became solidified as reservation
(quota) policies in legislative services, government jobs and educational institu-
tions in present-day India.
In 1918, The Maharaja (Supreme King) of Mysore, Krishna Raja Wadiyar IV,
received a petition from “depressed” classes in India. “Depressed” classes pri-
marily belonged to socio-economically disadvantaged groups. The petition elab-
orated upon their grievances regarding lack of representation in both govern-
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ment educational institutions and government jobs. Based on the petition, the
Maharaja of Mysore appointed the Miller Committee, headed by Justice Leslie
Miller. The purpose of the Miller Committee was to determine whether the non-
Brahmin community had adequate representation in state services. Meanwhile,
the British Government, eager to elicit Indian support in its efforts during the
First World War, had already accepted India’s long-standing request of establish-
ing self-governing institutions i.e. provincial assemblies and central legislative
assemblies. Self-governing institutions were formally introduced by the Govern-
ment of India Act, 1919 under the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms. The first pro-
visions for uplifting depressed classes of Indian society were passed under the
Government of India Act, 1919 (Bayly, 2008; Gilmour, 2019; Lee, 2020).
The provisions of the Government of India Act, 1919 begged a key question:
how does the government identify depressed sections of society? For this pur-
pose, the British Government appointed the Simon Commission to assess Indian
society and suggest reforms. The Simon Commission recommended “the need
to safeguard the minorities, and other socially and politically depressed classes
of people” (Bakshi, 1977). In 1923, the British Government decided not to extend
grants to schools which refused admissions to children belonging to depressed
classes. The depressed classes, under the leadership of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who
later became one of the leading architects of independent India’s constitution, de-
manded reservation of seats (quotas) for depressed classes in legislative bodies,
special educational concessions and recruitment in public sector jobs. The de-
pressed classes also demanded a separate electorate but the Simon Commission
did not accept this request (Jenkins, 2003).
The demands of the depressed classes were formally discussed in the Round
Table Conference of 1930 convened by the British Government. Shortly after, the
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Prime Minister of the British Government, Ramsay MacDonald, granted the Com-
munal Award upon India, partitioning it into separate electorates for Muslims,
Sikhs, Indian-Christians, Anglo-Indians, Europeans and depressed classes. Ma-
hatma Gandhi, who by then had established himself as the leader of the Civil
Disobedience Movement against the British Government, was opposed to reser-
vations of any kind. He was especially opposed to the provision of granting a
separate electorate to the depressed classes, and branded it as the “divide and
rule” policy of the British Government. However, B.R. Ambedkar was more sym-
pathetic towards reservations for depressed classes, including the provision of a
separate electorate. A comprise was reached between Mahatma Gandhi and B.R.
Ambedkar under the Poona Pact of 1932, which was signed in Yerwada Central
Jail on 24th September, 1932 (Roy, 2017). The Poona Pact agreed upon a single gen-
eral electorate to govern British India and the new central legislatures. As a result
of the pact, 141 seats were reserved for depressed classes in provincial councils. In
contrast, MacDonald’s award promised only 71. Depressed classes also received
a representation of 18% in central assemblies. The Poona Pact was finally ratified
by the Government of India Act, 1935, which also replaced the words “depressed
classes” with “Scheduled Castes”.
From 1942-1946, B.R. Ambedkar served as a member of the British Viceroy’s
Executive Council as a Minister for Labour. He used this position to further the
interests of depressed classes and demanded reservations in government educa-
tional institutions, in addition to government jobs. His demands became the foun-
dation of affirmative action policies for depressed classes (Scheduled Castes) in
independent India (Ambedkar, 2016).
In December 1946, almost a year before India gained independence, the first
Constituent Assembly, which included B.R. Ambedkar, deliberated upon the key
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features of the Indian constitution. The framers wanted to set up an egalitarian so-
ciety with special protections for the “socially, educationally and politically” dis-
advantaged communities. The Constituent Assembly comprised different com-
mittees to address different societal issues. The Minority Committee Report ar-
gued for reservations (quotas) for disadvantaged groups in proportion to their
representation in the population. The report argued for representation in legisla-
tures, higher educational institutions and government jobs. The Constituent As-
sembly also accepted the provision of a joint electorate but was opposed to reser-
vation on the basis of religion. Interestingly, reservations for depressed classes
were originally intended as temporary provisions subject to a review every ten
years, during which it would be open to the Indian Parliament to either renew or
abolish it (Khosla, 2020).
Many articles of the Indian constitution formalized affirmative action poli-
cies for disadvantaged groups. The articles were broadly aimed at forwarding
the representation of “backward classes”, which not only included members of
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) but also those from the Other
Backward Classes” (OBCs). These provisions begged an obvious question: what
determines “backwardness”? In 1953, the Kelkar Committee recommended caste
as the basis for determining “backwardness”. However, the Union Government
did not accept the recommendation. In M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963), the
Supreme Court ruled that “backward” classes should be classified on the basis of
caste, but social and educational backwardness should also be considered. More-
over, the Court ruled that “backwardness” of OBCs should be comparable to that
of the SCs and STs (Khosla, 2020).
In 1979, the Second Backward Classes Commission was setup under the chair-
manship of B.P. Mandal. The commission, also called The Mandal Commission,
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recommended caste as the basis for reservation. The commission also recom-
mended 27% reservation (quota) in central and state services, public undertakings
and educational institutions for OBCs. Given the already existing 22.5% reserva-
tion for SCs and STs, the fraction of reserved seats for disadvantaged castes (SCs,
STs and OBCs) was brought up to 49.5%. The Mandal Commission Report was
subject to widespread student protests in 1990. Nearly 200 college students be-
longing to the advantaged caste committed self-immolation, and 62 succumbed
to their burns. Despite these protests and a temporary stay order on the report
issued by the Supreme Court in 1992, the recommendations of the Mandal Com-
mmsion were formally implemented in 1993 (Panandiker, 1997).
Interestingly, none of the current constitutional provisions extend to provid-
ing compensatory hiring practices for disadvantaged castes in private sector jobs
(Madheswaran and Attewell, 2007; Madheswaran, 2008). The focus of this paper
is to assess the potential of such policies in promoting hiring diversity.
1.3 Setting and Data
1.3.1 Post-Secondary College Placements in India
Career offices in post-secondary educational institutions in India act as liaisons
between students and employers. Employers are invited by career offices to re-
cruit from college campuses following which firms conduct pre-interview screen-
ing tests involving written and verbal components, on-campus interviews and
make job offers. Career offices also collect information pertaining to the entire job
placement process. In particular, career offices collect information on job applica-
tions, pre-interview screening tests, job interviews, job offers and final job choices.
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Moreover, career offices make rules regarding the job placement process and re-
quire that students and firms abide by them. In the following section, I describe
the job placement process in my institutional setting.
1.3.2 The Placement Process
The job placement process involves the following steps: 1) the career office in-
vites firms, 2) invited firms post their job positions and compensation packages,
3) students apply for jobs, 4) firms determine eligibility for on-campus interviews
by conducting pre-interview screening tests comprising both written and verbal
components, 5) firms interview students on campus during slots (interview days)
allotted to them by the career office, 6) after conducting interviews, firms make
job offers, and 7) after receiving job offers, students make final job choices.
Figure 1.1 below shows a diagrammatic representation of the placement pro-
cess.
Figure 1.1: The Placement Process
A particular rule of the job placement process states that conditional on getting
a job offer on a given interview day, a student can no longer participate in inter-
views on future interview days. At best, a student can receive multiple job offers
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within a given interview day. If a student does not get any job offer on a particular
interview day, he can participate in interviews on future interview days.3 All job
offers are announced within a short interval of time at the end of the interview
day, typically late in the evening to prevent firms from coordinating on whom to
hire.
1.3.3 Data Overview
The administrative dataset collected by the career office of the post-secondary ed-
ucational institution has detailed information on both students and firms. The
sections below describe sample selection followed by some key descriptive facts
for both students and firms.
1.3.3.1 Sample Selection
I omit students pursuing the Master of Science (M.Sc.) degree and those in other
smaller degree programs. Such students are much fewer in number relative to
those pursuing other degrees. Moreover, these students are much less likely to
make use of the career office in their job search. I omit firms belonging to the
public sector. Such firms comprise less than 4% of all jobs available to students
in the degree programs included in the sample. Public sector firms are also quite
different than their private sector counterparts, especially in salary structure (pay-
scales for different job ranks with a substantial portion of the perks in the form of
allowances for transportation, phone bills, medical needs etc.), job stability etc.




Table 1.1 shows the total number of students belonging to each caste in each col-
lege degree.
Table 1.1: Distribution of Students by Caste in Each College Degree
Degree Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Total
Bachelor of Technology 579 710 1289
Dual Degree 622 617 1239
Master of Technology 616 586 1202
Master of Science 350 127 477
N 2167 2040 4207
Fraction 0.51 0.49 1
Notes: Table 1.1 includes the total number of students belonging to each caste in each college degree. The
college degrees included are Bachelor of Technology (B.Tech.), Dual Degree (a five year integrated Bachelor’s
and Master’s degree), Master of Technology (M.Tech.) and Master of Science (M.S.). Adv. Caste stands for
advantaged caste and Disadv. Caste stands for disadvantaged caste.
There are 4207 students in the sample. 2167 students belong to advantaged
castes and 2040 belong to disadvantaged castes. Due to affirmative action (quota)
policies in college admission, disadvantaged castes are represented in nearly equal
proportion as advantaged castes. Both Bachelor of Technology (B.Tech.) and Dual
degree students are admitted to the institution through a common entrance exam.
A Dual degree integrates undergraduate and post-graduate studies and is com-
pleted a year after the conventional four-year B.Tech. degree. In the B.Tech. de-
gree, the proportion of students belonging to advantaged castes is 0.45. In the
Dual degree, an almost equal proportion of students belong to each caste. Master
of Technology (M.Tech.) and Master of Science (M.S.) degree students are also ad-
mitted through a common entrance exam. In the M.Tech. degree, a roughly equal
proportion of students belong to each caste. The M.S. degree has a substantially
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larger proportion of advantaged castes relative to disadvantaged castes indicating
that despite admissions quotas, some college degrees may not be able to fill up all
college seats reserved for disadvantaged castes.
1.3.3.3 Differences Across Castes in Baseline Characteristics
In this section, I document differences in baseline characteristics across castes. The
largest differences are concentrated in pre-college skills, especially in college en-
trance exam scores. There are also large differences across castes in college GPA.
However, I find only modest differences across castes in previous labor market
experience. Previous labor market experience includes duration of internship em-
ployment, duration of part-time or full-time employment, total pay during intern-
ships, total pay during part-time or full-time employment, sectors of internship
employment and employment in startups. For students pursuing Master’s de-
grees, the dataset also includes other measures of employer-relevant experience
like specialization within the major (e.g. aerodynamics, computational fluid me-
chanics etc.) and software programming skills etc.
A) Pre-college Skills
There are substantial differences in pre-college skills across castes, especially in
college entrance exam scores. Table 1.2 reports differences in pre-college skills
across castes. The largest differences in pre-college skills are in college entrance
exam scores. Appendix Figure E.1 shows common support for students belonging
to either disadvantaged or advantaged castes within each entrance exam score
decile.
The differences in 10th and 12th grade national level examination scores are
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Table 1.2: Differences in Pre-College Skills Across Castes
B.Tech. Degree
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference (S.D.)
Avg. entrance exam score 0.41 -0.37 0.78∗∗∗
Avg. 10th grade score 0.07 -0.06 0.13
Avg. 12th grade score 0.04 -0.03 0.07
Dual Degree
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference (S.D.)
Avg. entrance exam score 0.34 -0.38 0.72∗∗∗
Avg. 10th grade score 0.03 -0.03 0.06
Avg. 12th grade score -0.03 0.03 −0.06
M.Tech. Degree
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference (S.D.)
Avg. entrance exam score 0.26 -0.28 0.54∗∗∗
Avg. 10th grade score 0.04 -0.04 0.08
Avg. 12th grade score 0.02 -0.02 0.04
M.S. Degree
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference (S.D.)
Avg. entrance exam score -0.02 0.07 −0.09
Avg. 10th grade score 0.001 -0.001 0.002
Avg. 12th grade score 0.01 -0.02 0.03
Notes: Table 1.2 documents differences in pre-college skills across castes. Pre-college skills include scores in 10th grade national level
examinations, 12th grade national level examinations and college entrance exam scores. All scores are pooled and normalized to have zero
mean and unit standard deviation. College entrance exam scores have been re-normalized so that higher numbers are better. The difference
across castes is reported in standard deviation units. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
substantially smaller. College entrance exam scores are the basis of college admis-
sions while test scores in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations are not.
Therefore, students have a larger incentive to differentiate themselves on college
entrance exam scores. Hence, differences across castes in college entrance exam
scores correspond to relatively smaller gaps in scores on 10th and 12th national
level examination.
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B) Within-College Academic Performance
There are also large differences across castes in college GPA. Table 1.3 reports dif-
ferences in overall college GPA (not adjusted for major) across castes. Differences
in overall college GPA are largest in the B.Tech. and Dual Degrees. Appendix Fig-
ure E.2 shows common support for students belonging to either disadvantaged or
advantaged castes within each college GPA decile.
Table 1.3: Differences in Average Overall GPA (Not Adjusted for Major) Across Castes
B.Tech. Degree
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference (S.D.)
Avg. Overall GPA 0.51 -0.42 0.93∗∗∗
Dual Degree
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference (S.D.)
Avg. Overall GPA 0.43 -0.43 0.86∗∗∗
M.Tech. Degree
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference (S.D.)
Avg. Overall GPA 0.33 -0.35 0.68∗∗∗
M.S. Degree
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference (S.D.)
Avg. Overall GPA 0.05 -0.13 0.18∗∗
Notes: Table 1.3 documents differences in average overall GPA (not adjusted for major) across castes. All scores are pooled and
normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 1.4 shows that college GPA and entrance exam scores are negatively cor-
related. College entrance exams determine whether students get assigned to selec-
tive majors.4 Selective majors are Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Me-
chanical Engineering, Civil Engineering and Chemical Engineering. These majors
have more challenging workloads making it harder to get high grade point aver-
ages. Hence, the regressions reported in Table 1.4 allow for a mean-shift in college
4In Appendix Tables E.24 and E.25, I show that student characteristics, like entrance exam
score and caste, are almost perfectly predictive of major assignments.
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GPA by major. Still, I find that a higher college entrance exam score is associated,
on average, with a lower college GPA.
Column (1) in Table 1.4 reports the negative correlation between GPA and en-
trance exam scores for B.Tech. degree students. A one-standard deviation higher
college entrance exam score is associated with an average decrease of 2.5% in col-
lege GPA.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1.4 report the relationship between GPA and
entrance exam scores for B.Tech. degree students in selective and non-selective
majors, respectively. Within selective majors, entrance exam scores and GPA are
not correlated. In contrast, within non-selective majors, a one-standard deviation
higher college entrance exam score is associated with an average decrease of 6%
in college GPA.
Table 1.4: GPA for B.Tech. Degree Students Negatively Correlated with Entrance Exam Score
Dependent Variable: (log) GPA
Coefficient All Non-Selective Majors Selective Majors
Disadv. Caste −0.171∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.162∗∗∗ (0.011) −0.187∗∗∗ (0.020)
Entrance Exam Score −0.025∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.008 (0.007) −0.060∗∗∗ (0.010)
N 1289 902 387
R2 0.237 0.232 0.264
Adjusted R2 0.230 0.225 0.249
Notes: Table 1.4 includes estimates from a regression of grade point averages (GPA) of B.Tech. degree holders on student characteristics.
Dependent variable is (log) GPA. Controls include college major, entrance exam score (standardized) and grades in 10th and 12th grade
national level examinations (standardized). College major includes dummies for each major. College entrance exam scores have been
re-normalized so that higher numbers are better. In column (1), I report results for all students. In column (2), I report results only for
students in non-selective majors. In column (3), I report results only for students in selective majors. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Overall these patterns indicate that low entrance exam scorers who get as-
signed less selective majors have a strong incentive to signal their “type” by rais-
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ing their within-major academic performance. These students perform better than
their comparatively higher scoring peers in the same major. On the other hand,
high entrance exam rank scorers in selective majors may not have a strong in-
centive to differentiate themselves further, at least academically. These students
appear to drop off compared to their lower scoring peers in the same major. The
negative relationship between entrance exam scores and GPA persists across all
college degrees (see, Appendix Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3).
The results above could be explained by random variation in entrance exam
scores conditional on ability (proxied by GPA). Students at the top of the distri-
bution will have more positive error in their entrance exam scores conditional on
ability. This will be less true for students in the lower range of the ability distri-
bution. However, the overall effect is likely much stronger at the top of the distri-
bution because the pool of students entering the college is truncated at relatively
high entrance exam scores.
C) Previous Labor Market Experience
I find only modest differences across castes in previous labor market experience.
Table 1.5 reports differences in previous labor market experience across castes.
On average, disadvantaged castes are statistically indistinguishable from ad-
vantaged castes in weeks of former employment, total pay during internships,
total pay during part-time or full-time employment and employment in startups.
Among B.Tech. and Dual degree students, disadvantaged castes are also sim-
ilar to advantaged castes in sectors of former employment. Among M.Tech and
M.S. degree students, disadvantaged castes are less likely to be previously em-
ployed in the technology sector, as likely to be previously employed in the con-
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Table 1.5: Differences in Previous Labor Market Experience Across Castes
B.Tech. and Dual Degrees
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference
Avg. Internship Duration (Weeks) 8.00 (0.06) 7.81 (0.07) 0.19∗∗
Fraction worked in the IT sector 0.22 (0.05) 0.22 (0.04) 0.00
Fraction worked in the Consulting Sector 0.35 (0.05) 0.37 (0.05) −0.02
Fraction worked in the Manufacturing Sector 0.43 (0.05) 0.41 (0.06) 0.02
Fraction worked in a startup 0.34 (0.05) 0.30 (0.05) 0.04
Total Internship Pay ($) 3042.24 (249.40) 2877.28 (220.89) 164.96
M.Tech and M.S. Degrees
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Difference
Avg. Part-Time/Full-Time Employment Duration (Weeks) 68.48 (4.52) 68.93 (6.96) −0.45
Fraction worked in the IT sector 0.36 (0.04) 0.18 (0.07) 0.18∗∗∗
Fraction worked in the Consulting Sector 0.19 (0.04) 0.15 (0.06) 0.04
Fraction worked in the Manufacturing Sector 0.45 (0.05) 0.67 (0.08) −0.12∗∗∗
Total Part-Time/Full-Time Employment Pay ($) 22523.80 (1458.03) 19645.89 (1390.32) 2877.91
Notes: Table 1.5 documents differences in previous labor market experience across castes. Previous labor market experience includes internship duration (weeks), part-time or full-time employment
duration (weeks), total pay during internships, total pay during part-time or full-time employment, sectors of employment and employment in startups. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
All dollar amounts are in puchasing power parity (PPP) units. T-tests are conducted for differences in overall means. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
sulting sector and more likely to be previously employed in the manufacturing
sector.
For students pursuing Master’s degrees, I do not find significant differences
across castes in specialization within major (e.g. aerodynamics, computational
fluid mechanics etc.) and software programming skills (not shown).
The absence of prohibitively large caste disparities in previous labor market
experience is surprising since disadvantaged castes have substantially lower test
scores and college GPA than advantaged castes.
1.3.3.4 Firms
In the sample, a job designation (henceforth, “job”) means a job title within a firm.
For example, a firm can hire a Product Manager and a Software Engineer. Firms
offer different salaries to different college degrees for the same jobs. B.Tech. de-
gree holders will typically get paid lower salaries than M.Tech. degree holders for
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the same jobs. Firms do not pay different salaries to different majors within the
same college degree. There is no differential pay across castes or gender within
the same jobs. Some firms pay the same salaries for the same jobs across college
degrees, despite some college degrees having one or more additional years of ed-
ucation.
Table 1.6: Firm Sectors, Location and Average Salary
Sector Fraction of Sample Fraction Non-Domestic Avg. Salary ($)
Technology 0.52 0.85 67302.64
Consulting 0.20 0.00 63544.02
Manufacturing 0.28 0.15 43525.25
Notes: Table 1.6 shows the distribution of firms by sector, the fraction of non-domestic jobs by sector and the average salary across all
jobs by sector. Column (1) shows the distribution of firms in each sector. Column (2) shows the fraction of non-domestic jobs belonging
to each sector. Column (3) shows the average salary of all jobs in a given sector. All dollar amounts are in purchasing power parity (PPP)
terms.
Table 1.6 shows the distribution of firms by sector, the fraction of non-domestic
jobs by sector and the average salary across all jobs by sector. 52% of all jobs be-
long to the technology sector, 20% belong to the consulting sector and 28% be-
long to the manufacturing sector. Among all non-domestic jobs, 85% belong to
the technology sector and 15% belong to the manufacturing sector. The average
salary across all jobs in the technology sector is $67,302.64 (PPP). The average
salary across all jobs in the consulting sector is $63,544.02 (PPP). Manufacturing
jobs pay much less than jobs in either consulting or technology. The average salary
across all jobs in the manufacturing sector is $43,525.25 (PPP).
In addition to salaries, compensation bundles for jobs include stock options,
signing bonuses, performance bonuses, relocation allowances, medical insurance
etc. Like salaries, these other forms of compensation vary across but not within
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college degrees. The administrative dataset comprises information on over 40
different types of non-pecuniary amenities offered by firms.5 Therefore, firms
horizontally differentiate themselves along many characteristics, besides pay, to
attract their favorite candidates.
Table 1.7: Select Non-Pecuniary Amenities by Job Sector
Non-Pecuniary Amenity Technology Consulting Manufacturing
Stock Options 29.52 27.00 17.85
Signing Bonus 25.58 24.77 22.08
Mediclaim Insurance 18.00 15.75 20.28
Relocation Allowance 36.78 40.95 28.80
401 Benefits/EPF 26.01 34.24 23.80
Confirmation Bonus 37.80 32.44 31.35
Retention Bonus 32.76 22.50 36.60
Travel Allowance 37.26 46.80 43.02
Annual Bonus 37.83 36.04 34.35
Performance Bonus 30.60 36.45 29.80
Notes: Table 1.7 shows the fraction of firms in each sector offering a select subset of non-pecuniary amenities. EPF stands for Employees’
Provident Fund.
Table 1.7 shows the fraction of firms in each sector offering a select subset of
non-pecuniary amenities. On average, a given non-pecuniary amenity is offered
by a larger proportion of firms in the technology or consulting sectors than those
in the manufacturing sector.
Importantly, firms are required by the placement office to commit to the com-
pensation bundles they advertise for each job before the start of the job search pro-
cess i.e. before students start applying. Therefore, salaries and non-pecuniary
amenities posted by jobs are non-negotiable at any of the stages before the job of-
5In my dataset, I categorize some fringe benefits as “non-pecuniary” amenities since, for a
substantial portion of the sample, I do not have information on direct cash-equivalents of such
benefits.
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fer stage (especially, at the third-round interview) and even after the job offer has
been made. Commitment on job characteristics is enforced by the placement office
by requiring employers to fill an employer registration form detailing compensa-
tion packages, and also requiring that students submit a copy of the job offer letter
to match against what was previously advertised by the employer. Ex-ante com-
mitment and ex-post verification of job characteristics rules out differences in ne-
gotiation skills as a potential source of the earnings gap across castes. Differences
in negotiation ability have been a well documented source of the earnings gap
in other contexts, especially across gender (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Gneezy
and Croson, 2009; Bertrand, 2011; Blau and Kahn, 2017; Recalde and Vesterlund,
2020).
1.4 Descriptive Facts
Before proceeding to the model, I establish key descriptive facts specific to my
institutional setting. These descriptive facts establish caste disparities in earn-
ings and job assignments. Moreover, these descriptive facts also shed light on
promising channels for policy intervention and inform modeling choices. In all
of the regression results shown below, I run different regression specifications at
the student level controlling for GPA, degree, major and entrance exam scores
both linearly and through flexible polynomials. For Bachelor’s degree holders,
I also control for previous internship experience, including detailed job descrip-
tions, duration of employment, total internship pay, sectors of employment and
employment in startups. For students pursuing Master’s degrees, I control for un-
dergraduate degree, undergraduate major, undergraduate GPA, previous intern-
ship experience, previous part-time or full-time job experience, total pay during
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former part-time or full-time employment, sectors of former part-time or full-time
employment, specialization within college degree (e.g, aerodynamics, computa-
tional fluid mechanics etc.) and software programming skills.
1.4.1 Large Earnings Gap Between Castes
Using data on job placements, I first document large earnings disparities between
advantaged and disadvantaged castes. I run different specifications of the follow-
ing regression:
log(earningsi) = α + β×Disadv. Castei + Controlsi + εi. (1.1)
Table 1.8: Earnings Gap
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Full Interactions
Disadv. Caste −0.113∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.115∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.107∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.105∗∗∗ (0.017)
N 2927 2927 2927 2927
R2 0.452 0.455 0.459 0.532
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.448 0.450 0.486
Notes: Table 1.8 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs. Dependent
variable is log earnings. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including
grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and
winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree includes dummies for each degree. Each column
is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), GPA and entrance exam scores enter as quadratic
polynomials while other controls enter linearly. In column (3), GPA and entrance exam scores enter as cubic polynomials while other
controls enter linearly. In column (4), estimates are reported from a fully-flexible quadratic polynomial regression with all possible
interactions between controls. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
The coefficient of interest is β, which is reported in Table 1.8 for four alternative
specifications. The unconditional earnings gap across castes is -0.174 (0.016) log
points, or 17.4%. After including detailed controls for pre-college skills, within-
college academic performance and previous labor market experience, I find that
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disadvantaged castes earn, on average, 0.113 (0.014) log points, or 11%, less than
comparable advantaged castes. The results are robust to many different specifica-
tions (see, Appendix Tables E.4 and E.5).
The earnings gap reported in Table 1.8 is conservative. Table 1.8 only includes
those students who got jobs through the career office. Appendix Tables E.6 and
E.7 show that disadvantaged castes are much more negatively selected out of this
sample on GPA and entrance exam scores than advantaged castes. Since average
earnings are increasing in GPA and entrance exam scores (not shown), the earn-
ings gap reported in Table 1.8 is conservative.
1.4.2 Job Applications Do Not Explain the Earnings Gap
Using data on job applications, I show that the composition of job applications
does not explain the earnings gap reported in Table 1.8. Figure 1.2 below shows
the raw distribution of salaries of jobs to which students applied.
Even without any controls, the distribution of salaries of jobs to which students
applied is strikingly similar across castes. These similarities are largely explained
by the presence of a centralized job application portal (like, JOE, EconJobMarket
etc.), which makes the marginal cost of an additional application effectively zero.
The difference between castes in the unconditional mean salary of jobs to which
students applied is only -0.04 (0.001) log points, or 4%. To see if this difference
remains salient in the presence of controls, I run different specifications of the
following regression:
log(Avg. Salary of Jobs Applied toi) = α + β×Disadv. Castei + Controlsi + εi.
(1.2)
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Salaries of Jobs to Which Students Applied
Notes: Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of job salaries to which students applied. The top panel shows the distribution
of job salaries to which advantaged castes applied. The bottom panel shows the distribution of job salaries to which
disadvantaged castes applied. The vertical lines denote the average salaries of jobs to which students applied.
The coefficient of interest is β, which is reported in Table 1.9 for four alternative
specifications. Table 1.9 shows that the difference between castes in the average
salary of jobs to which students applied is only -0.001 (0.007) log points, or 0.1%.
The difference is economically very small, and statistically insignificant. There-
fore, the composition of job applications does not explain the earnings gap across
castes. The results are robust to many different specifications (see, Appendix Ta-
bles E.8 and E.9).
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Table 1.9: Salaries of Jobs to Which Students Applied
Dependent Variable: Log Avg. Salary of Jobs Applied To (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Full Interactions
Disadv. Caste −0.001 (0.007) −0.001 (0.008) −0.001 (0.007) −0.001 (0.007)
N 4207 4207 4207 4207
R2 0.554 0.556 0.557 0.613
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.553 0.553 0.585
Notes: Table 1.9 includes estimates from a regression run on the sample of all students who applied for jobs. Dependent variable is log average salary of jobs to which
students applied. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level
examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree
includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), GPA and entrance exam score enter as
quadratic polynomials while other controls enter linearly. In column (3), GPA and entrance exam score enter as cubic polynomials while other controls enter linearly. In
column (4), estimates are reported from a fully-flexible quadratic polynomial regression with all possible interactions between controls. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table 1.10 shows that disadvantaged and advantaged castes submit, on aver-
age, the same number of job applications.
Table 1.10: No. of Jobs to Which Students Applied Fully-Flexible Polynomials
Dependent Variable: Log No. of Jobs Applied to
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Full Interactions
Disadv. Caste −0.012 (0.033) −0.034 (0.034) −0.038 (0.037) −0.034 (0.033)
N 4207 4207 4207 4207
R2 0.248 0.427 0.443 0.446
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.385 0.388 0.395
Notes: Table 1.10 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs. Dependent variable is log number of firms
to which students applied. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade
national level examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major.
College degree includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic
polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible
interactions between controls. In column (4), estimates from a natural cubic spline with three degrees of freedom are reported. The results are robust to other reasonable
choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available on request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
The absence of differences between castes in both job application salaries and
the number of job applications has immediate policy implications. In particular,
policies which induce changes in job application behavior will not mitigate caste
disparities in earnings.
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1.4.3 Almost All of the Earnings Gap is at the Hiring Stage
In this section, I lay out one of the key contributions of the paper. In particu-
lar, I quantify the role of each step of the job placement process in explaining the
earnings gap reported in Table 1.8. To my knowledge, this is the first paper docu-
menting the incremental drop off in earnings at successive stages of job search.
I argue that almost all of the earnings gap reported in Table 1.8 is at the hir-
ing stage. In my institutional setting, firms conduct pre-interview screening tests
often comprising both written and verbal components. The written component
(first round) is a timed aptitude test. The verbal component (second round), also
called group discussion (GD), tests students’ abilities to effectively communicate
among their peers on a given topic. Firms conduct interviews (third round) based
on outcomes from pre-interview screening tests and, ultimately, make job offers.
To show that almost all of the earnings gap is at the hiring stage, I run different
specifications of the following regression:
log(Avg. Salary of JobsJob Search Stagei ) = α + β×Disadv. Castei + Controlsi + εi.
(1.3)
where Job Search Stage ∈ {Application, Aptitude Test, Group Discussion (GD),
Interview, Offers, Accepted Offers}. The coefficient of interest is β, which is shown
in Figure 1.3 for each successive stage of job search.
There is a substantial winnowing down in the number of jobs available at each
successive stage of job search. The number of jobs available to each student re-
duces by about 35% between any two stages, except between job interviews and
job offers where the drop-off is much sharper due to the rules of the job placement
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Figure 1.3: Earnings Gap Across Castes at Each Job Search Stage
Notes: Figure 1.3 shows the coefficient β corresponding to the regression in Equation 1.3. β represents the percentage
difference in the average salary at each job search stage between advantaged and disadvantaged castes. Each dot is the
coefficient β from a separate regression. The vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. These regressions include controls.
process (see, Section 1.3.2).
Figure 1.3 shows that almost all of the earnings gap is at the hiring stage. As re-
ported in Table 1.9, job applications do not explain the earnings gap. Pre-interview
screening tests account for only 14% of overall earnings gap. 86% of the earnings
gap is concentrated between job interviews and job offers.
The earnings gap decomposition is also informative of effective policies to mit-
igate caste disparities in earnings. Since firm hiring exclusively drives the earn-
ings gap, policy responses would be most effective if they directly incentivize
firms to hire more disadvantaged castes. However, understanding worker choice
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is still important. Workers may have preferences over job characteristics, be-
sides pay, which drive final job choices. Quantifying preferences of workers over
such characteristics is necessary to fully account for the effects of policy responses
aimed at firms to hire more disadvantaged castes.
The large drop off in earnings at the offer stage raises the possibility that dif-
ferences in socio-emotional skills may be driving some of the observed earnings
gap across castes. However, it is not clear whether these “social skills” represent
caste cues or are genuinely valuable skills (Mamidi, 2010). Moreover, the drop off
in earnings occurs among students who were selected for one-on-one interviews
(third round) after group discussion based “soft-skills” tests (second round). In
my institutional setting, nearly 85% of the jobs are non-client facing, which sug-
gests that employers may not have a substantial preference for students on the
right tail of the socio-emotional skills distribution compared to those closer to the
mean. In a different context, I study the role of socio-emotional skills in determin-
ing college investment, job search behavior and labor market outcomes in an elite
MBA program in the U.S. (Humphries and Shukla, 2020).
Another possible explanation for the earnings drop off at the offer stage is that
employers may not make high paying job offers to disadvantaged castes because
advantaged castes may have better “outside options.” For example, such “outside
options” may represent aspects of broader discrimination, like better job offers
procured from outside of the centralized placement process. However, nearly 99%
of all graduating students in this college participate in searching for jobs through
the help of the placement office. If students are discovered to be searching for jobs
“offline” i.e. outside of the centralized placement process, they are debarred from
the services of the placement office in their on-campus job search. Hence, in this
context, the lack of “offline” job opportunities limits the possibility of advantaged
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castes leveraging employers for high paying job offers.
1.4.3.1 The Differential Role of the Group Discussion Stage Across Sectors
Figure 1.3 shows that the initial drop off in earnings across castes occurs at the
group discussion stage. On average, disadvantaged castes perform similarly to
advantaged castes in written aptitude tests. The drop off at the group discussion
stage raises the possibility that disadvantaged castes have worse communication
skills, on average, than advantaged castes. Alternatively, it is possible that while
differences in communication skills across castes are not substantial, these skills
are valued differently in different sectors. For example, firms in the consulting
sector may place a large weight on communication skills while making interview
decisions and exacerbate small initial differences in communication skills across
castes.
In this section, I study whether the drop off in earnings across castes at the
group discussion stage shown in Figure 1.3 varies by sector. I find that the drop
off in earnings across castes at the group discussion stage occurs only among con-
sulting jobs and not among jobs in either technology or manufacturing.
Figure 1.4 shows the decomposition of the earnings gap in the manufacturing
sector. There is no drop off in earnings across castes at the group discussion stage.
The point estimate of the earnings gap across castes among manufacturing jobs is
about 4%, and the upper bound of the 95% confidence interview is slightly above
zero (see also, Appendix Table E.10).
Figure 1.5 shows the decomposition of the earnings gap in the technology sec-
tor. Notably, there is still no drop off in earnings across castes at the group discus-
sion stage. However, the point estimate of the earnings gap across castes among
39
Figure 1.4: Earnings Gap Across Castes at Each Job Search Stage in the Manufacturing Sector
Notes: Figures 1.4 shows the coefficient β corresponding to the regression in Equation 1.3 among jobs in the manufacturing
sector. β represents the percentage difference in the average salary at each job search stage between advantaged and dis-
advantaged castes. Each dot is the coefficient β from a separate regression. The vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.
These regressions include controls.
jobs in technology is about 8% (see also, Appendix Table E.11).
Figure 1.6 shows the decomposition of the earnings gap in the consulting sec-
tor. Unlike in manufacturing or technology jobs, there is a drop off in earnings
across castes at the group discussion stage among consulting jobs. The point esti-
mate of the earnings gap across castes among jobs in consulting is about 10% (see
also, Appendix Table E.12).
Overall, these findings indicate that the drop off in earnings across castes at the
group discussion stage, shown in Figure 1.3, is exclusively driven by the consult-
ing sector. These results suggest the possibility that communication skills are val-
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Figure 1.5: Earnings Gap Across Castes at Each Job Search Stage in the Technology Sector
Notes: Figures 1.5 shows the coefficient β corresponding to the regression in Equation 1.3 among jobs in the technology
sector. β represents the percentage difference in the average salary at each job search stage between advantaged and dis-
advantaged castes. Each dot is the coefficient β from a separate regression. The vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.
These regressions include controls.
ued differently by consulting jobs. However, based on the absence of an earnings
drop off at the group discussion stage among jobs in technology and manufac-
turing, it seems unlikely that average differences in communication skills across
castes are prohibitively large. After all, verbal skills are part of the pre-interview
screening mechanisms of most jobs in technology and manufacturing. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume such firms value communication skills to some degree.
Still, it is challenging to formally disentangle differences in communications skills
across castes from the weights placed on them by firms in different sectors.
It is also challenging to formally separate the role of caste in firm hiring from
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Figure 1.6: Earnings Gap Across Castes at Each Job Search Stage in the Consulting Sector
Notes: Figure 1.6 shows the coefficient β corresponding to the regression in Equation 1.3 among jobs in the consulting
sector. β represents the percentage difference in the average salary at each job search stage between advantaged and dis-
advantaged castes. Each dot is the coefficient β from a separate regression. The vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.
These regressions include controls.
differences in communication skills across castes. One could identify a random
effect on the odds of getting through different types of interviews, with factor
loadings that depend on job sectors. However, the random effect may not be com-
munication skills. Moreover, by definition, such a specification would be uninfor-
mative regarding caste related differences in the distribution of communication
skills.
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1.4.4 Differences in Job Assignments Are Most Pronounced in
the Consulting Sector and in Client Facing Jobs
Motivated by the differential impact on castes by sector (particularly, at the group
discussion stage), I examine whether there are characteristics of a job, besides pay,
that predict a disadvantaged caste hire. I find that, even unconditional on pay,
consulting jobs and client-facing jobs are less likely to hire disadvantaged castes.
These findings are consistent with a Beckerian framework of labor market sorting
in which job assignments might be driven by the affinity of clients in some sectors,
like consulting, to work with advantaged castes (Becker, 1971).
Figure 1.7: Differences in Job Offer Probabilities Across Caste by Job Sector
Notes: Figure 1.7 shows the coefficient β corresponding to the regression in Equation 1.4. β represents the difference
between advantaged and disadvantaged castes in the probability of getting a job offer from either the consulting, manufac-
turing or technology sector. Each dot is the coefficient β from a separate regression. The vertical bars are 95% confidence
intervals. These regressions include controls.
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I first show that, even unconditional on pay, jobs in the consulting sector are
less likely to hire disadvantaged castes. To do so, I run different specifications of
the following regression:
1{i hired in the j sector} = α + β×Disadv. Castei + Controlsi + εi. (1.4)
where j ∈ {Technology, Consulting, Manufacturing}. The coefficient of interest is
β. These regressions include only those students who submitted at least one job
application in a given sector.
Figure 1.7 above shows that differences in job assignments between advan-
taged and disadvantaged castes are most pronounced in the consulting sector. On
average, disadvantaged castes are 8% less likely to get consulting jobs than ad-
vantaged castes.
The trends are reversed in the manufacturing and technology sectors. Disad-
vantaged castes are as likely as advantaged castes to get jobs in manufacturing.
Disadvantaged castes are 4% more likely to get jobs in technology than advan-
taged castes (see, Appendix Tables E.13, E.14 and E.15).
I now show that, even unconditional on pay, client facing jobs are less likely to
hire disadvantaged castes. Detailed job descriptions (particularly, job titles and job
functions) were used to categorize jobs as client-facing versus non-client facing.
Typically, a software engineering role would be considered as non-client facing
whereas a consulting or managerial role would be considered as client-facing. To
do so, I run different specifications of the following regression:
1{i got a k job} = α + β×Disadv. Castei + Controlsi + εi. (1.5)
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Figure 1.8: Differences in Job Offer Probabilities Across Caste by Job Type
Notes: Figure 1.8 shows the coefficient β corresponding to the regression in Equation 1.5. β represents the difference
between advantaged and disadvantaged castes in the probability of getting a job offer from either a client facing or a non-
client facing job. Each dot is the coefficient β from a separate regression. The vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.
These regressions include controls.
where k ∈ {Client Facing, Non-Client Facing}. The coefficient of interest is β.
These regressions include only those students who submitted at least one job ap-
plication in a given type of job.
Figure 1.8 above shows that differences in job assignments between advan-
taged and disadvantaged castes are most pronounced within client facing jobs.
On average, client facing jobs are 8% less likely to hire disadvantaged castes than
advantaged castes. In contrast, non-client facing jobs are 6% more likely to hire
disadvantaged castes than advantaged castes (see, Appendix Tables E.16, E.17,
E.18 and E.19).
Overall, the descriptive facts shown in Section 1.4 serve two main purposes.
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First, they uncover the mechanisms behind observed earnings differentials across
castes. Second, they shed light on promising channels for policy intervention and
inform modeling choices. Policies which provide information about jobs, improve
performance at university, or modify preferences are unlikely to close the earnings
gap. Counterfactual policies to address hiring disparities will be more effective if
they directly incentivize firms to hire more disadvantaged castes.
1.5 A Model of the Job Placement Process
Guided by the sequential decomposition of the earnings gap, I build a model of
the job placement process and study policies to mitigate caste disparities in hiring.
In particular, I build a model of job hiring and job choices. Using the model, I re-
cover the “caste penalty” imposed by firms on disadvantaged castes. To mitigate
the effect of caste on firm hiring, I evaluate the relative efficacy of two counterfac-
tual policies.
A model of job hiring and job choices allows us to fully account for the effects
of counterfactual hiring policies. In particular, the model allows firms to respond
by changing their hiring strategies under counterfactual policies. Given the coun-
terfactual distribution of job offers, students then choose jobs in accordance with
their multi-faceted preferences over job characteristics.
1.5.1 Setup and Notation
Given that most students apply everywhere conditional on eligibility, I omit job
applications from the model (see, Section 1.4.2; Appendix Tables E.8 and E.9). In
Appendix Section C, I show how the model can be extended to incorporate job
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application behavior, which may be important in other settings.
I also take the interview days allotted to firms as exogenous. Past interview
day allocations and job characteristics are almost perfectly predictive of current
interview day allocations (see, Appendix Tables E.20 and E.21). Among these job
characteristics, job salaries are the only significant determinants of interview day
assignments. A one standard deviation increase in salary increases the probability
of getting assigned the first interview slot (first interview day) by 8%. However,
I take job salaries as exogenous. The assumption is plausible since the institution
comprises a small fraction of a firm’s total hiring pool. Hence, it is reasonable
to assume that firms do not coordinate job salaries across universities. To pro-
vide some evidence, I scrape data from Glassdoor and Levels.fyi and show that
average reported job salaries are very similar to the salaries offered for the same
job-location combination in my institutional setting (see, Appendix Table E.22).6
Since job salaries in my institutional setting — the only significant determinants
of interview day assignments — are similar to those offered to other students in
other universities, it is plausible to assume that interviews days are exogenous.
All things the same, a firm in the consulting sector has a 2% higher probability,
relative to a firm in the manufacturing sector, of being assigned the first interview
day. Conditional on observables, firms in the technology sector do not have a
comparative advantage over manufacturing firms in interview day assignments.
Compared to job salaries and sectors, job titles play an insignificant role in inter-
view day assignments.
The binary variable Aij indicates whether student i applies to job j.7 The vector
Ai = (Ai1, . . . , Ai J) collects these indicators for all jobs. Let Aki be a vector of
6For more details, visit www.glassdoor.com and www.levels.fyi.
7Recall, a “job” means a job-designation within a firm.
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indicators which takes the value 1 if student i applies to a job allotted interview
day k. Similarly, let Zki be a vector of indicators which takes the value 1 if student
i gets accepted from a job allotted interview day k.
Taking student applications as given, job j accepts student i on interview day k
with probability πij, which depends upon both student and job characteristics. Let
Zij be an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if student i receives an offer
from job j and 0 otherwise. The vector Zi = (Zi1, . . . , Zi J) collects all job offers for
student i. Given job offers, students make final job choices.
1.5.2 Stage 2: Job Choices by Students
The model is solved backwards starting from final job choices followed by job
offers. At the job choice stage, students know their job offers and there is no
uncertainty about preferences. The set of job options for student i denoted by
O(Zi) is
O(Zi) = {0} ∪ {j : Zij = 1}. (1.6)
where the outside option is denoted by j = 0. In this model, the outside option is
indistinguishable from unemployment. Let Uij be the utility of student i from job
j. Uij depends upon student and job characteristics, econometrician-unobserved
random effect qi and a job offer acceptance shock, ε1ij, realized after job offers are
known but before final job choices are made. Mathematically,
Uij = X′ijβ+ NP
′




γmNPjm + ε1ij. (1.7)
where Xij includes student and firm characteristics, NPj = (NPj1, . . . , NPjm) is a
vector of non-pecuniary amenities for job j and wj is the (log) salary offered by job
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j. For identification, econometrician-unobserved qi does not enter the utility for
the outside option i.e. qi shifts the value of all jobs uniformly relative to the value
of unemployment. Furthermore, interacting qi with non-pecuniary amenities like
stocks, signing bonuses, relocation allowances etc. allows random marginal ef-
fects for non-pecuniary amenities and drives preferential selection over job offers.
Each element in the vector ε1i = ({ε1ij}j∈J , ε1i0) is drawn from an independent,
identically distributed Type-1 extreme value distribution and qi ∼ N (0, σ2q ).
The value of the outside option at the job offer acceptance stage is given by
Ui0 = ε1i0. (1.8)
Student i’s optimal choice of job j given his set of job offers O(Zi) solves the
following problem:
C∗i = arg max
j∈O(Zi)
Uij −Ui0. (1.9)
1.5.3 Stage 1: Job Offers
Recall from Section 1.5.1 that Zki denotes the offer vector of student i on interview
day k. Similarly, Aki denotes the application vector of student i on interview day
k.
For a given interview day allotment to firms, define the probability of inter-
view day k job offers given interview day k job applications, conditional on being
eligible for an interview day k job offer, by









ij + (1− πij)(1− Zkij)
]




where πij is the probability that job j accepts student i, which depends upon both
student and job characteristics. Akij is an indicator taking the value 1 if student i
applied to job j allotted interview day k and 0 otherwise. Zkij is an indicator taking
the value 1 if student i received an offer from job j allotted interview day k and
0 otherwise. In Equation 1.10, I am assuming that a firm allotted interview day k
makes job offers independently of any other firm allotted the same interview day.
This assumption is plausible since the career office requires all firms conducting
interviews on the same interview day to announce job offers within a very short
interval of time at the end of the interview day, typically late in the evening to
prevent firms from coordinating on whom to hire (see, Section 1.3.2).
Let f (Zi|Ai) denote the the probability of realizing a job offer vector Zi given
an application vector Ai. The formula for f (Zi|Ai) is shown in Appendix Sec-
tion A.
1.5.3.1 Student Choice by Jobs
We now describe how jobs choose students in more detail. A job j accepts a stu-
dent i with probability πij, which depends upon both student and job characteris-
tics.
Each job chooses an incoming cohort of students to maximize expected utility.
For a job j, the utility from student i is given by
Vij = S′ijα+ Disadv. Castei × η − wjφ + qiδ + µij. (1.11)
where Sij is a vector of student and job characteristics including dummies for
whether or not a student qualified for the aptitude test (first round), group dis-
cussion based “soft skills” tests (second round) or the one-on-one interview (third
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round), wj is the (log) salary offered by job j, qi is econometrician-unobserved
student-level attributes and µij is an idiosyncratic match term, which is unobserv-
able to student i but observable to job j. Sij also includes other controls for pre-
college skills, within-college academic performance and previous labor market
experience. We will assume that each µij follows a standard logistic distribution
and is independent across all students and jobs.
As shown in Equation 1.11, the probability of getting an offer from job j de-
pends upon econometrician-unobserved qi which is observable to student i. There-
fore, from the student’s perspective, job offer probabilities on a given interview
day are independent based on the information available to him. However, job
offer probabilities on a given interview day are not independent from the econo-
metrician’s perspective as they are all functions of qi.
One might wonder if, instead of the same q entering the utilities of students
and jobs, it would be more reasonable to allow for two different, but correlated,
sources of unobserved heterogeneity: one that affects how students value jobs and
vice-versa. While theoretically desirable, in a world where most students apply
to all eligible jobs, such a correlation will be difficult to identify in practice. For
example, if we consider such a correlation to represent the “quality” of the in-
formation (or, a signal) observed by the student about his employer-observed q,
then the ideal data should have observably identical students with better signals
applying more “aggressively”. However, with little variation in student applica-
tion behavior, conditional on observables, such a correlation will be difficult to
identify.
Let C(j) denote the set of applicants who accept an offer from job j. We will
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assume that the utility of job j from cohort C(j) is given by
V j(C(j)) = ∑
i∈C(j)
Vij. (1.12)
An economic interpretation of Equation 1.12 is that jobs do not focus on comple-
mentarities or team-building during hiring. The assumption is plausible since the
university comprises a small fraction of a job’s overall incoming cohort i.e. a job
does not coordinate hiring across universities. Moreover, jobs select students for
interviews based on written and verbal aptitude tests which are general in scope.
The assumption of firms not focusing on complementarities or team building dur-
ing hiring is also common in the firm-worker matching literature (Chade et al.,
2006).
In Equation 1.12 above, the utility of job j is defined for a given cohort C(j).
C(j) is random from the perspective of job j when it is deciding which students to
extend offers to. Accepting an offer from job j depends upon students’ preferences
over other jobs (through εij′ in Equation 1.7) while getting other jobs depends
upon idiosyncratic match terms not observed by job j (through µij′ in Equation
1.11). While job j does not observe µij′ for j′ , j, it observes (Sij, wj, qi, µij) for each
student i. Job j solves







s.t. E(C(j)) ≤ Mj. (1.14)
where the above expectation is taken over unknowns from the perspective of job
j, A(j) is the set of applicants to job j, Z(j) is the set of applicants who receive
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offers from job j and Equation 1.14 is the ex-ante hiring constraint faced by job
j. The left-hand side of Equation 1.14 is the expected size of the incoming cohort
C(j) for job j. We will assume that each job j has an ex-ante hiring cap which we
denote by Mj.
Note that econometrician-unobserved q enters the utility functions of both stu-
dents and jobs. An economic interpretation of such a specification is that jobs may
choose students either because they like high q students (see, Equation 1.11) or be-
cause high q students are more likely to accept an offer conditional on getting one
(see, Equations 1.7 and 1.14). Hence, q acts as a productivity term while also af-
fecting preferences over jobs.8 Proposition 1 below shows that each job j follows
a cutoff rule when deciding whether or not to hire student i.
Proposition 1. Each job j follows a cutoff hiring rule denoted by k∗j and hires a student i
iff Vij > k∗j .
Proof. The proof follows from Kapor (2020). We prove the proposition above by
contradiction. Let Hire{j} : {1, . . . , I} → [0, 1] be a hiring rule used by job j
which satisfies Equation 1.14. Suppose it is not a cutoff rule. Then there exist two
students i and i′ such that Vij > Vi′ j but Hire{j}(i) < 1 and Hire{j}(i′) > 0. Let
Pij and Pi′ j denote the probabilities that students i and i′ accept offers from job j.
Then, for some ε > 0, it is feasible for job j to increase Hire{j}(i) by εPij , reduce
Hire{j}(i′) by εPi′ j and increase overall cohort quality. 
The proposition above relies on the assumption that each job j observes (Sij, wj,
qi, µij) in Equation 1.11. The information observed by job j is sufficient for its val-
uation of the utility, Vij, it gets from student i. Observing decisions of other jobs
does not affect job j’s best estimate of Vij.
8See, Howell (2010) for a similar treatment of unobserved heterogeneity.
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1.5.4 Equilibrium







where i ∈ {1, . . . , I} indexes the student and j ∈ {1, . . . , J} indexes the job such
that:
(1) At the final stage, student i’s optimal choice of job j given his set of job offers
O(Zi) solves
C∗i = arg max
j∈O(Zi)
Uij −Ui0. (1.15)
where Uij and Ui0 are given by Equations 1.7 and 1.8 respectively.
(2) Given the application vector Ai of student i, each job j solves







s.t. E(C(j)) ≤ Mj. (1.17)
where the expectation above is taken over unknowns from the perspective
of job j, C(j) is the incoming cohort for job j, A(j) is the set of applicants to
job j, Z(j) is the set of applicants who receive offers from job j, Equation 1.17
is the ex-ante hiring constraint faced by job j and Mj is the ex-ante hiring
cap for job j. As shown in Proposition 1, the decision problem of job j can be
expressed as simply one of choosing a cutoff k∗j , which will be estimated for
each job j. Note that k∗j is not a structural parameter and will be allowed to
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change under counterfactuals.
1.6 Identification and Estimation
1.6.1 Identification
I assume that characteristics like caste, salaries, non-pecuniary amenities etc. en-
tering the utility function of students are exogenous. Similarly, exogenous charac-
teristics entering the utility functions of jobs include salaries, sector, caste, major
and degree etc. Identification of the preference parameters comes from variation
in the exogenous variables entering the utility functions of jobs and students. For
example, variation in job choices of students and variation in job characteristics
identify student preferences over salaries and other non-pecuniary amenities like
stocks, signing bonuses, relocation allowances etc. Parameters describing interac-
tions between student and job characteristics (like, caste × salary) are identified
by variation in job choices of observably similar students belonging to different
castes. Variation in student characteristics and variation in the decisions of jobs
regarding whom to accept identify preferences of jobs over student characteristics
like GPA, caste, major and degree.
Differences in job choices and job offers among observationally equivalent stu-
dents and jobs identify the distributional parameters of unobservable preferences
entering their utility functions. For example, conditional on having the same job
offer sets, two observationally equivalent students making different job choices
identifies differences in their unobservable preferences for jobs. Correlation in
job offers within a student’s job application portfolio identifies the variance of
econometrician-unobserved q in the utility functions of jobs. Highly correlated
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job offer outcomes within a student’s job application portfolio, conditional on ob-
servables, imply that q plays an important role in job hiring. The factor loading
on q in the utility functions of jobs is identified by the variation in job offers across
observationally equivalent students with observationally equivalent job applica-
tion portfolios. Effectively, the factor loading on q allows for average effects of
unobservable student-level attributes in the utility functions of jobs.
Identification of the caste parameter entering Equation 1.11 is crucial as coun-
terfactual policies will aim to mitigate the “caste penalty” imposed by firms on
disadvantaged castes. I assume that the caste coefficient entering the utility func-
tions of jobs is causal. To address concerns regarding potential differences in
unobservable ability by caste, I include detailed measures of pre-college skills,
within-college academic performance and previous labor market experience. Pre-
college skills include entrance exam ranks, scores on 10th grade national level
examinations and scores on 12th grade national level examinations. Information
on within-college academic performance includes details on coursework and col-
lege GPA, major and degree. Information on previous labor market experience in-
cludes duration of former employment, detailed job descriptions, total internship
pay, total part-time or full-time employment pay, sectors of former employment
and employment in startups. Additionally, for students pursuing Master’s de-
grees, I include detailed measures of undergraduate education including under-
graduate degree, undergraduate major, undergraduate GPA, specialization within
the degree (e.g., aerodynamics, computational fluid mechanics etc.) and software
programming skills. Finally, in Equation 1.11, I also include dummies for whether
or not a student qualified for the aptitude test (first round), group discussion (sec-
ond round) or the one-on-one interview (third round) stage in the vector of stu-
dent and job characteristics, Sij.
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I also assume that econometrician-unobserved q is independent of caste and
any other observables, where the observables include detailed controls, includ-
ing selection into third-round interviews in the job search process. Appendix Ta-
bles E.23, E.24 and E.25 address whether it is plausible to assume q in the firm’s
hiring decision (Equation 1.11) as being orthogonal to student observables, es-
pecially major. For this purpose, I consider a subset of jobs which are “major-
neutral” i.e. allow students from all majors to apply. Such jobs are typically in
the consulting sector, although some are also in the technology and manufactur-
ing sectors. If there is evidence that students in selective majors (like, Computer
Science) are being selected at the same rates as those in less selective majors (like,
Ocean Engineering), it would suggest that econometrician-unobserved q is or-
thogonal to major. Indeed, I find that non-selective majors are as likely to get
hired as selective majors in “major-neutral” jobs. “Major-neutral” firms conduct
written and verbal aptitude tests which are general in scope. Therefore, being in a
more selective major does not necessarily improve the odds of being hired by such
firms. Hence, it is unlikely that econometrician-unobserved q is a primary driver
of selection into majors because, all things the same, high q students in more se-
lective majors should have higher job offer rates in “major-neutral” jobs than low
q students in less selective majors.
1.6.2 Estimation
I describe each of the choice probabilities below, the likelihood function to be es-
timated and the estimation method.
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1.6.2.1 Job Choice by Students
Conditional on qi ∼ N(0, σ2q ) and given the assumption that each element in the
vector of job acceptance shocks, ε1i , follows independent Type-1 extreme value
distributions, the probability of student i choosing job j at the job choice stage is




where O(Zi) denotes offer set of student i, Xij is the vector of student and firm
characteristics, wj is the (log) salary, NPj is the vector of non-pecuniary amenities
and uij = X′ijβ+ NP
′
jΨ + wjτ + qi + qi ×∑Mm=1 γmNPjm.
1.6.2.2 Job Offers
Conditional on qi ∼ N(0, σ2q ) and given the assumption that the idiosyncratic
match specific term µij between student i and job j follows a standard logistic
distribution, the probability of student i getting accepted from job j is
πij(Sij, wj, qi, k
∗
j ) =
exp(S′ijα+ Disadv. Castei × η − wjφ + qiδ− k∗j )
1 + exp(S′ijα+ Disadv. Castei × η − wjφ + qiδ− k∗j )
. (1.19)
where Sij is the vector of student and job characteristics, wj is the (log) salary
offered by job j and k∗j is the cutoff hiring rule followed by job j. Let f (Zi|Ai)
denote the the probability of realizing a job offer vector Zi given an application
vector Ai. The formula for f (Zi|Ai) is shown in Appendix Section A.
I estimate the parameters by maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) and com-
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pute standard errors using the information identity. See Appendix Section B for
more details.
1.7 Parameter Estimates
As an intermediate step towards evaluating counterfactual policies, I assign dol-
lar amounts to non-pecuniary characteristics which enter the utility functions of
students and jobs. To do so, I scale the coefficients of interest by the coefficient on
wage and express utility in wage units.
1.7.1 Student Preferences Over Job Characteristics
Table 1.11 shows select parameter estimates entering the utility functions of stu-
dents. Unless otherwise stated, all compensation measures are interpreted for a
student with mean qi. All dollar amounts are in purchasing power parity (PPP)
terms.
Stock options and signing bonuses are the most valuable non-pecuniary ameni-
ties.9 All things the same, a student needs to be compensated 5.1% of average
salary ($2909) to remain indifferent between a job that offers stock options versus
one that does not. A student needs to be compensated 6.5% of average salary
($3683) to remain indifferent between a job that offers a signing bonus versus one
that does not. Other non-pecuniary amenities like relocation allowance, medical
insurance and performance bonuses are not valued as highly as stock options or
signing bonuses.
9As mentioned before, in my dataset, I categorize some fringe benefits as “non-pecuniary”
amenities since, for a substantial portion of the sample, I do not have information on direct cash-
equivalents of such benefits.
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Table 1.11: Select Parameter Estimates (Student Utility)
Parameter Estimates (Student Utility)
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Compensation ($) Std. Error ($) Compensation (%) Std. Error (%)
Salary (log), τ 2.482∗∗∗ 0.008 — — — —
Signing Bonus 0.156∗∗∗ 0.005 +3683.111∗∗∗ 120.058 +6.489∗∗∗ 0.211
Performance Bonus 0.049∗∗∗ 0.008 +1132.033∗∗∗ 199.491 +1.994∗∗∗ 0.351
Medical Insurance 0.046∗∗∗ 0.010 +1062.080∗∗∗ 233.872 +1.871∗∗∗ 0.412
Relocation Allowance 0.078∗∗∗ 0.010 +1812.616∗∗∗ 246.859 +3.193∗∗∗ 0.434
Restricted Stock Units 0.124∗∗∗ 0.002 +2908.609∗∗∗ 50.599 +5.123∗∗∗ 0.089
Getting a Job in Technology 0.078∗∗∗ 0.005 +1812.616∗∗∗ 115.655 +3.193∗∗∗ 0.204
Getting a Job in Consulting 0.087∗∗∗ 0.006 +2025.454∗∗∗ 143.100 +3.567∗∗∗ 0.252
Unobserved heterogeneity, σq 0.042∗∗∗ 0.004 +968.942∗∗∗ 92.339 +1.706∗∗∗ 0.162
Disadv. Caste × Salary (log) −0.013 0.099 — — — —
Disadv. Caste × Signing Bonus −0.026 0.061 -591.654 1380.824 −1.042 2.432
Disadv. Caste × Performance Bonus −0.011 0.117 -251.072 2664.572 −0.442 4.693
Disadv. Caste ×Medical Insurance −0.013 0.134 -296.602 3049.280 −0.522 5.371
Disadv. Caste × Relocation Allowance −0.039 0.131 -885.165 2949.910 −1.559 5.196
Disadv. Caste × Restricted Stock Units −0.012 0.127 -273.842 2891.160 −0.482 5.093
Disadv. Caste × Technology −0.046 0.065 -1042.574 1459.487 −1.836 2.571
Disadv. Caste × Consulting 0.016 0.079 +367.188 1818.833 +0.647 3.204
Average Salary = $56,767.29 (PPP), N = 4207 (no. of students), J = 644 (no. of jobs).
Notes: Table 1.11 includes estimates for select student preference parameters over job characteristics. The compensation terms are calculated for a person with
average unobserved heterogeneity (q) in units of dollars (PPP). A positive compensation means, all things the same, a student needs to be paid that amount to
remain indifferent between a job that has the non-pecuniary amenity versus one that does not. A negative compensation means, all things the same, a student
can part with that amount and still remain indifferent between a job that has the non-pecuniary amenity versus one that does not. The standard errors for the
compensation terms are calculated through the delta method. Full estimation tables are available upon request. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%.
A student needs to be compensated 3.2% of average salary ($1813) to remain
indifferent between a job that offers relocation allowance versus one that does
not. A student only needs to be compensated 1.9% of average salary ($1062) for
the removal of medical insurance and 2% of average salary ($1132) for the removal
of performance bonus.
There are no differences between castes in preferences over job characteristics,
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including non-pecuniary amenities and job sectors. The absence between groups
in preferences over job characteristics is in contrast to those found in similar stud-
ies on labor market disparities, especially across gender (Altonji and Blank, 1999;
Buser et al., 2014; Eriksson and Kristensen, 2014; Flory et al., 2014; Goldin, 2018;
Mas and Pallais, 2017; Zafar and Wiswall, 2018). In my institutional setting, dif-
ferences between castes in preferences over job characteristics do not explain caste
disparities in earnings and job assignments.
Jobs in the consulting sector are the most preferred. A student needs to be
compensated 3.6% of average salary ($2025) to give up a job in the consulting sec-
tor and take one in the manufacturing sector. A student needs to be compensated
3.2% of average salary ($1813) to give up a job in the technology sector and take
one in the manufacturing sector. However, since first jobs may persist and dispar-
ities in starting salaries may have long term effects, these compensation measures
may not fully capture the true willingness-to-pay to remain indifferent across sec-
tors.
The average paying consulting job is typically preferred over the average pay-
ing manufacturing job. In fact, the average paying manufacturing job can almost
never compete with the average paying consulting job. Ignoring the error terms,
student utility from the average paying manufacturing job with non-pecuniary
amenities including signing bonus, performance bonus, medical insurance, relo-
cation allowance and stock options will typically still be lower than student utility
from the average paying consulting job without these non-pecuniary amenities.
The average paying manufacturing job will typically offer a worse set of non-
pecuniary amenities making the task of choosing between the average paying con-
sulting or manufacturing job even easier (see, Table 1.7). The match-up between
the average paying firms in the consulting and technology sectors is fairer. On av-
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erage, firms in the technology sector offer a richer set of non-pecuniary amenities
than those in the consulting sector (see, Table 1.7). Given a small pay differen-
tial between a job in the consulting sector or the technology sector, students will
typically choose the latter.
Table 1.12: Select Random Marginal Effects for Non-Pecuniary Amenities
Parameter Estimates (Student Utility)
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
γSigning Bonus 0.217∗∗∗ 0.053
γPerformance Bonus 0.526∗∗∗ 0.049
γMedical Insurance 0.017 0.079
γRelocation Allowance 0.286∗∗∗ 0.051
γRestricted Stock Units 0.487∗∗∗ 0.104
Notes: Table 1.12 includes estimates for factor loadings (γm) in Equation 1.7, where m indexes non-pecuniary amenities or fringe benefits.
Full estimation tables are available upon request. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Econometrician-unobserved qi plays only a modest role in the utility functions
of students. Consider a job that does not offer any non-pecuniary amenities. To
get the same utility from that job as a student with one standard deviation higher
qi, a student with mean qi needs to be compensated 1.7% ($969) of average salary.
Table 1.12 shows random marginal effects over non-pecuniary amenities. To get
the same utility as a student with one standard deviation higher qi, a student with
mean qi needs to be compensated 6% of average salary ($3400) for the removal
of stock options, 6.9% of average salary ($3906) for the removal of signing bonus,
3.7% of average salary ($3209) for the removal of relocation allowance and 2.9%
of average salary ($1652) for the removal of performance bonus. Therefore, qi not
only shifts the value of all jobs relative to the value of unemployment but also
drives preferential selection over job offers by making high qi students value non-
pecuniary amenities more than low qi students (see, Equation 1.7).
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1.7.2 Job Preferences Over Student Characteristics
Table 1.13 shows select parameter estimates entering the utility functions of jobs.
All dollar amounts are in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.
Table 1.13: Select Parameter Estimates (Job Utility)
Parameter Estimates (Job Utility)
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Employer Subsidy ($) Std. Error ($) Employer Subsidy (%) Std. Error (%)
Salary (log), φ 1.893∗∗∗ 0.074 — — — —
Disadv. Caste, η −0.093∗∗∗ 0.030 +2721.486∗∗∗ 863.231 +4.794∗∗∗ 1.521
Unobserved heterogeneity, σq 0.042∗∗∗ 0.004 +1245.627∗∗∗ 125.895 +2.194∗∗∗ 0.222
Parameter on σq, δ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.024 — — — —
Bachelor of Technology (B.Tech.) Degree
College GPA 0.077∗∗∗ 0.023 +2262.744∗∗∗ 667.570 +3.986∗∗∗ 1.175
College GPA × Consulting 0.018∗∗ 0.010 +537.226∗∗ 299.516 +0.946∗∗ 0.522
College GPA × Technology 0.028∗∗ 0.012 +833.485∗∗ 357.073 +1.468∗∗ 0.630
Entrance Exam Score 0.022∗∗ 0.011 +655.917∗∗ 326.920 +1.155∗∗ 0.576
Dual Degree
College Degree 0.039 0.033 +1157.567 972.072 +2.039 1.712
College GPA 0.121∗∗∗ 0.021 +3515.013∗∗∗ 604.677 +6.192∗∗∗ 1.065
College GPA × Consulting 0.012 0.076 +358.718 2264.842 +0.632 3.990
College GPA × Technology 0.014 0.052 +418.283 1548.101 +0.737 2.727
Entrance Exam Score 0.019∗∗ 0.010 +566.922∗∗ 297.577 +0.998∗∗ 0.524
Master of Technology (M.Tech.) Degree
College Degree 0.203∗∗∗ 0.041 +5772.520∗∗∗ 1130.359 +10.169∗∗∗ 1.991
College GPA 0.123∗∗∗ 0.028 +3571.245∗∗∗ 796.479 +6.291∗∗∗ 1.403
College GPA × Consulting 0.038∗∗ 0.017 +1128.183∗∗ 503.132 +1.987∗∗ 0.886
College GPA × Technology 0.048 0.052 +1421.328 1521.945 +2.504 2.681
Entrance Exam Score 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 +89.893∗∗∗ 29.988 +0.158∗∗∗ 0.053
Master of Science (M.S.) Degree
College Degree 0.182∗∗∗ 0.063 +5203.660∗∗∗ 1727.431 +9.167∗∗∗ 3.043
College GPA 0.090∗∗∗ 0.022 +2635.767∗∗∗ 636.632 +4.643∗∗∗ 1.121
College GPA × Consulting 0.023 0.057 +685.550 1689.161 +1.207 2.976
College GPA × Technology 0.078 0.051 +2291.530 1472.316 +4.036 2.593
Entrance Exam Score 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 +89.893∗∗∗ 29.998 +0.158∗∗∗ 0.053
Average Salary = $56,767.29 (PPP), N = 4207 (no. of students), J = 644 (no. of jobs).
Notes: Table 1.13 includes estimates for the preference parameters of jobs over student characteristics. A positive subsidy means an employer
needs to be compensated by that amount to remain indifferent. Employer subsidy measures for entrance exam scores are calculated for a unit
standard deviation decrease in entrance exam score. College entrance exam scores (ranks) have been re-normalized so that higher numbers are
better. Employer subsidy measures for GPA are calculated for a unit standard deviation decrease in GPA. The standard errors for the employer
subsidy terms are calculated through the delta method. Degree fixed effects are shown relative to the Bachelor’s degree. College GPA and sector
interactions are shown relative to manufacturing sector. Full estimation tables are available upon request. * significant at 10%, ** significant at
5%, *** significant at 1%.
Overall, firms need to be subsidized 4.8% of average salary ($2721) to remain
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indifferent between hiring, an observably identical disadvantaged or advantaged
caste. This compensating amount is a one-time payment: 4.8% of first year salary
on the first job instead of 4.8% of average salary during the expected job tenure.
The “caste penalty” imposed by firms for disadvantaged castes is consistent with
descriptive facts which show the adverse effect of caste on firm hiring. The com-
pensation required for employers to remain indifferent between, otherwise iden-
tical, advantaged or advantaged castes is much higher than the amount required
to offset a one standard deviation decrease in college entrance exam scores and
on par with the amount required to offset a one standard deviation decrease in
college GPA.
College GPA is much more valuable to firms than college entrance exam scores.
The following interpretation of estimates is for Bachelor’s degree holders. A firm
in the manufacturing sector needs to be subsidized 4% of average salary ($2263) to
offset a one standard deviation decrease in GPA. Relative to a firm in the manufac-
turing sector, a firm in the consulting sector needs to be subsidized an additional
0.9 percentage points of average salary ($537) to offset a one standard deviation
decrease in GPA. Overall, a firm in the consulting sector needs to subsidized 4.9%
of average salary ($2800) to offset a one standard deviation decrease in GPA. Rel-
ative to a firm in the manufacturing sector, a firm in the technology sector needs
to be subsidized an additional 1.5 percentage points of average salary ($833) to
offset a one standard deviation decrease in GPA. Overall, a firm in the technology
sector needs to subsidized 5.5% of average salary ($3096) to offset a one standard
deviation decrease in GPA.
In contrast, employer compensations for reductions in college entrance exam
scores are substantially lower. A firm in the manufacturing sector needs to a sub-
sidized 1.2% of average salary ($655) for a one standard deviation decrease in en-
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trance exam scores. The marginal effects of entrance exam ranks are statistically
indistinguishable across sectors. The relative importance of GPA and entrance
exam scores for other college degrees are reported in Table 1.13.
Econometrician-unobserved qi plays only a modest role in the utility functions
of jobs. A firm needs to be subsidized 2.2% of average salary ($1246) to offset a
one standard deviation decrease in econometrician-unobserved qi.10
1.7.3 Job Cutoffs
Job cutoffs are consistent with descriptive evidence on selectivity. Table 1.14 shows
job cutoffs by pay category, job sector and job title for aggregate firms.11
As expected, cutoffs are increasing in pay category. The top 25% paying jobs
have the highest cutoffs whereas the bottom 25% paying jobs have the lowest
cutoffs.
To better understand differences in selectivity of jobs across sectors and job
titles, consider a simple application portfolio with just one job application in the
“aggregate” sector. Assume also that the student is eligible to get a job offer. Jobs
in consulting are the hardest to get followed by jobs in manufacturing and tech-
nology, respectively. A marginal hire in a manufacturing job needs to be subsi-
dized 5.6% of average salary ($3,176) to have the same odds of getting an offer as
a marginal hire in a consulting job.12 In contrast, a marginal hire in a technology
job needs to be subsidized 36.7% of average salary ($20,840) to have the same odds
of getting an offer as a marginal hire in a consulting job.
10Assuming a factor loading of δ = 1.
11An ”aggregate” firm in a given category (e.g. sector) has the hiring cutoff averaged over all
firms in that category.
12A “marginal hire” has the same expected “score” implied by Equation 1.11 as the cutoff to get
a job offer.
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Table 1.14: Select Job Cutoffs by Pay Category, Job Sector and Job Title
Job Cutoffs (Job Utility)
Pay Category
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Top 25% −16.300∗∗∗ 0.749
50%-75% −16.487∗∗∗ 0.765
25%-50% −16.779∗∗∗ 0.762
Bottom 25% −17.138∗∗∗ 0.767
Job Sector









Average Salary = $56,767.29 (PPP), N = 4207 (no. of students), J = 644 (no. of jobs).
Notes: Table 1.14 includes estimates of the job cutoffs by pay category, job sector and job title for aggregate firms. An
”aggregate” firm in a given category (e.g. sector) has the hiring cutoff averaged over all firms in that category. Note that
the job cutoff estimates are not structural parameters as they are allowed to change under counterfactual policies. Full
estimation tables are available upon request. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
All things the same, managerial roles are the easiest to get followed by engi-
neering and consulting roles, respectively. A marginal hire in a managerial role
needs to be subsidized 35.8% of average salary ($20,305) to have the same odds
of getting an offer as a marginal hire in a consultant role. A marginal hire in an
engineering role needs to be subsidized 11.3% of average salary ($6,442) to have
the same odds of getting an offer as a marginal hire in a consultant role.
Overall, job cutoffs are such that average students have a relatively low chance
of success, with any specific application. However, with an average of a few hun-
dred applications per job slot, strong students are not guaranteed offers either.
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1.7.4 Model Fit
The model-simulated earnings gap across castes is close to the observed earnings
gap across caste. Although I do not use moments designed to match observed
earnings gap in the data, the model does a good job of matching the observed
earnings gap. The model-simulated earnings gap across castes is 10.6%. The ob-
served earnings gap across castes is 11%.















Notes: Table 1.15 compares the empirical job offer and job choice probabil-
ities to the corresponding model-simulated probabilities. Model-simulated
probabilities are computed by simulating the model using the MSL estimates
300 times for each observation in the sample, and then averaging over the
number of observations and the number of simulation draws.
The model also matches observed job choices and job offers in the data well.
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Table 1.15 shows empirical job offer and job choice probabilities along with the
corresponding model-simulated predictions.
The model slightly under-predicts job offers and job choices belonging to the
consulting and manufacturing sectors. The model slightly over-predicts job of-
fers and job choices belonging to the technology sector. In the sample, 30% of
all students are unemployed, while the model predicts an unemployment rate of
31%.
1.8 Counterfactuals
As shown in Section 1.7.2, caste has a significant impact on firm hiring. To mitigate
the role of caste on firm hiring, I evaluate the effects of two counterfactual poli-
cies. First, I consider a policy in which firms are subsidized by the cash-equivalent
amount that makes them indifferent between hiring an observably identical ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged caste. Next, I consider a “pre-college intervention”
policy which equalizes the distribution of pre-college skills (college entrance exam
scores) across castes. Note that both counterfactual policies improve the “skills”
of disadvantaged castes (see, Equation 1.11).
The cash-equivalent subsidy will be one common subsidy given to all firms,
regardless of firm characteristics, like sector. This common subsidy will be nearly
5% of first year salary in the first job. Estimating different weights on caste is
more of a theoretical curiosity, since subsidizing firms in proportion to the mag-
nitudes of their discrimination may lead to perverse incentives, especially since
my model does not distinguish between taste-based or statistical discrimination.
Seen through the lens of my model, it would not be inconsistent to view a higher
subsidy for consulting firms, compared to firms in technology, as a compensation
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for their higher animus toward disadvantaged groups.
The “pre-college intervention” policy encompasses different types of interven-
tions in India which focus on improving pre-college test scores. Such policies typ-
ically use randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to induce (plausibly) exogenous
changes in test scores. Examples of such policies include hiring tutors, paying
teachers bonuses, redesigning school curricula etc. (Asim et al., 2015) which are
then evaluated through the changes they induce in learning outcomes, like test
scores.
Crucially, the composition of advantaged and disadvantaged castes remains
fixed under both policies. Affirmative action policies in college admissions equal-
ize the distribution of castes within each major, and, therefore, within each cohort.
I also keep GPA fixed in the counterfactuals, an assumption which overestimates
the effects of the “pre-college intervention” policy (see, Table 1.4; Appendix Ta-
bles E.1, E.2 and E.3).
1.8.1 Counterfactuals: Intuition
To build some intuition regarding the effects of the proposed counterfactuals, I
consider two extreme strategies by jobs in response to the improvement in the
“skills” of disadvantaged castes.
1.8.1.1 Perfectly Elastic Supply of Jobs
In the first case, jobs hire everyone who qualifies. This strategy corresponds to the
supply of job slots being perfectly elastic. As shown in Figures 1.9 and 1.10, when
jobs do not adjust cutoffs, disadvantaged caste hires are at least as large as in the
baseline. There is also no displacement of advantaged castes from jobs.
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Figure 1.9: Disadvantaged Caste Hires under Perfectly Elastic Supply of Jobs
Notes: In Figure 1.9 the distribution of advantaged caste “scores” are to the right of the distributions of disadvantaged
caste “scores”. “Scores” can be calculated from Equation 1.11. As shown in Figure 1.9, the distribution of disadvantaged
caste “scores” shifts to the right. In the absence of jobs adjusting cutoffs, disadvantaged caste hires, depicted by the shaded
area in the top panel, are at least as large as in the baseline.
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Figure 1.10: Advantaged Caste Hires under Perfectly Elastic Supply of Jobs
Notes: In Figure 1.10, the distributions of advantaged caste “scores” are to the right of the distributions of disadvantaged
caste “scores”. “Scores” can be calculated from Equation 1.11. As shown in Figure 1.10, the distribution of advantaged caste
“scores” stays the same. In the absence of jobs adjusting cutoffs, advantaged caste hires, depicted by the shaded area in the
bottom panel, are the same as in the baseline. When the supply of job slots is perfectly elastic, there is no displacement of
advantaged castes from jobs.
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1.8.1.2 Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Jobs
In the second case, jobs adjust cutoffs to hire the same total number of students
(in expectation) as in the baseline. This strategy corresponds to the supply of job
slots being perfectly inelastic.
As shown in Figures 1.11 and 1.12, when the supply of job slots is perfectly
inelastic, the number of disadvantaged caste hires is at least as large as in the
baseline. However, the number of disadvantaged caste hires is bounded above by
the number of disadvantaged caste hires when the supply of job slots is perfectly
elastic.
The number of advantaged caste hires is lower than in the baseline. The num-
ber of advantaged caste hires is bounded below by the number of advantaged
caste hires when the supply of job slots is perfectly inelastic. There is no displace-
ment of advantaged castes when the supply of job slots is perfectly elastic, which
provides an upper bound of the number of advantaged caste hires.
Hence, by allowing jobs to respond to new hiring policies by adjusting cut-
offs, the model captures the most salient aspects of the growing deliberations on
advancing compensatory hiring practices for disadvantaged castes: advancement
into and displacement from jobs.
The viewpoint of allowing firms to choose between one of two extreme hir-
ing rules is also a natural way to bound plausible responses under counterfactual
policies. If a portion of the population becomes higher “skilled”, firms would typ-
ically do a combination of increasing the hiring threshold a little and hiring a few
more people.
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Figure 1.11: Disadvantaged Caste Hires under Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Jobs
Notes: In Figure 1.11, the distributions of advantaged caste “scores” are to the right of the distributions of disadvantaged
caste “scores”. “Scores” can be calculated from Equation 1.11. Under both counterfactual policies, the distribution of
disadvantaged caste “scores” shifts to the right. When jobs adjust cutoffs to hire the same total number of students (in
expectation) as in the baseline, the number of disadvantaged caste hires is at least as large as in the baseline. As shown
in Figures 1.9 and 1.11, the number of disadvantaged caste hires when the supply of job slots is perfectly inelastic can
be no more than the number disadvantaged caste hires when the supply of job slots is perfectly elastic. The number of
disadvantaged caste hires is bounded above by the number of disadvantaged caste hires when the supply of job slots is
perfectly elastic. The number of disadvantaged caste hires is bounded below by the number of disadvantaged caste hires
when the supply of job slots is perfectly inelastic. Therefore, when jobs follow cutoff hiring rules, the model bounds the
effects of both counterfactual policies on job placements of disadvantaged castes.
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Figure 1.12: Advantaged Caste Hires under Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Jobs
Notes: In Figure 1.12, the distributions of advantaged caste “scores” are to the right of the distributions of disadvantaged
caste “scores”. “Scores” can be calculated from Equation 1.11. Under both counterfactual policies, the distribution of
disadvantaged caste “scores” shifts to the right. As shown in Figure 1.12, the distribution of advantaged caste “scores” stays
the same. When jobs adjust cutoffs, the number of advantaged caste hires falls compared to the number of advantaged
caste hires in the baseline. As shown in Figures 1.10 and 1.12, the number of advantaged caste hires is bounded above
by the number of advantaged caste hires when supply job slots is perfectly elastic. The number of advantaged caste
hires is bounded below by the number of advantaged caste hires when the supply of job slots is perfectly inelastic. The
displacement of advantaged castes from jobs is the highest when the supply of job slots is perfectly inelastic and lowest
when the supply of job slots is perfectly elastic. Therefore, when jobs follow cutoff hiring rules, the model bounds the
effects of both counterfactual policies on job displacements of advantaged castes.
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1.8.2 Counterfactual Results
In this section, I compare the reductions in workplace caste disparities from a
policy which provides direct cash subsidies to employers to those from a policy
which improves the pre-college skills (college entrance exam scores) of disadvan-
taged castes.
1.8.2.1 Job Offers
The subsidy-equivalent for employers to remain indifferent between hiring an ob-
servably identical disadvantaged or advantaged caste is 4.8% of average salary
($2721). In contrast, using the weights on college entrance exam scores reported
in Table 1.13, I find that the subsidy-equivalent for employers of a policy which
equalizes the distribution of college entrance exam scores across castes is only
0.6% of average salary ($337). Equalizing the distribution of college entrance exam
scores is worth about 8 times less to employers than direct compensation to hire
more disadvantaged castes. Therefore, employer cash-subsidies increase job as-
signments and earnings of disadvantaged castes by substantially more than the
“pre-college intervention” policy.
As an example to compare performances across policies, we will focus on the
technology sector. The relative performances of both policies in the technology
sector can be better understood through the lens of the model. From the perspec-
tive of a disadvantaged caste student, an increased job cutoff is equivalent to an
increase in the salary paid by the same job. Both lower the probability of getting
a job offer (see, Equation 1.18 and Table 1.13). Therefore, an increased job cutoff
offsets some of the positive effect of the direct subsidy or the increase in entrance
exam scores on hiring.
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When cutoffs do not adjust under the “pre-college intervention” policy, the
“subsidy” to hire disadvantaged castes is about 0.6% of average salary ($337).
When cutoffs adjust under the policy of providing direct cash subsidies to em-
ployers, the net effect of the subsidy to hire disadvantaged castes, averaged over
all jobs in the technology sector, is about 2% of average salary ($1135). The net ef-
fect of the subsidy when employers are provided cash subsidies is still more than
three times the direct subsidy-equivalent of the “pre-college intervention” policy.
Therefore, among jobs in the technology sector, even the lowest effects of em-
ployer cash-subsidies on job assignments of disadvantaged castes will typically
be larger than the highest effects of the ”pre-college intervention” policy.
Table 1.16 shows the effects on job hiring in the technology sector under both
policies. Under the policy of providing cash-subsidies to employers, job assign-
ments of disadvantaged castes increase between 5% to 13% when cutoffs adjust
and do not adjust, respectively. The effects on jobs assignments of disadvantaged
castes under the “pre-college intervention” policy are substantially lower. Under
the “pre-college intervention” policy, job assignments of disadvantaged castes in-
crease between 2% to 5% when cutoffs adjust and do not adjust, respectively. Sim-
ilar reasoning explains the relative performances of both policies among jobs in
other sectors and pay categories.
The effects of employer cash subsidies in increasing job assignments of disad-
vantaged castes are most pronounced in the consulting sector. I focus on the more
interesting case in which jobs adjust cutoffs. Table 1.14 shows that, on average,
firms in the technology or manufacturing sectors have lower hiring cutoffs than
those in the consulting sector. Hence, when cutoffs do not adjust under both poli-
cies, firms in the technology and manufacturing sectors draw a larger number of
disadvantaged castes above their hiring thresholds than those in the consulting
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Table 1.16: Job Offers by Sector in Baseline and Counterfactuals
Job Offers by Sector
Baseline
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste ∆ Adv. Caste (%) ∆ Disadv. Caste (%)
Technology 0.53 0.47 — —
Consulting 0.63 0.37 — —
Manufacturing 0.56 0.44 — —
Employer Cash-Subsidies
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Technology 0.51 0.49 -0% +13%
Consulting 0.57 0.43 -0% +29%
Manufacturing 0.51 0.49 -0% +21%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Technology 0.51 0.49 -5% +5%
Consulting 0.57 0.43 -10% +18%
Manufacturing 0.49 0.51 -12% +15%
Pre-College Intervention
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Technology 0.52 0.48 -0% +5%
Consulting 0.61 0.39 -0% +9%
Manufacturing 0.54 0.46 -0% +10%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Technology 0.53 0.47 -2% +2%
Consulting 0.61 0.39 -3% +6%
Manufacturing 0.53 0.47 -6% +7%
Notes: Table 1.16 shows the fraction of job offers by caste in each sector under both baseline and counter-
factuals.
sector. On average, there is a larger excess supply of candidates above the hir-
ing thresholds of firms in the manufacturing and technology sectors than those of
firms in the consulting sector. Hence, to hire the same total number of students
as before, firms in the technology and manufacturing sectors will increase hiring
cutoffs by more, on average, than firms in the consulting sector (see, Appendix Ta-
bles E.26 and E.27). A larger increase in cutoffs implies a smaller net effect of the
subsidy for hiring disadvantaged castes. Due to the smaller net effect of the sub-
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sidy for hiring disadvantaged castes, firms in the manufacturing and technology
sectors will typically hire fewer disadvantaged castes, as a proportion of previous
hires, than those in the consulting sector.
Table 1.16 shows the effects on job hiring in the consulting sector under the
policy of providing direct cash subsidies to employers. Under this policy, job
assignments of disadvantaged castes increase between 18% to 29% when cutoffs
adjust and do not adjust, respectively. The effects of employer cash subsidies
on disadvantaged caste hires in the technology and manufacturing sectors are
smaller.
Details regarding relative performances of both policies on job offers within
pay categories can be found in Appendix Table E.28.
1.8.2.2 Job Choices
The effects of employer cash subsidies in improving final job choices of disadvan-
taged castes are most pronounced in the consulting sector.
Two complementary mechanisms explain the result above. First, as a propor-
tion of previous hires, direct cash subsidies to employers lead to substantially
more disadvantaged castes hires in consulting jobs than the “pre-college inter-
vention” policy (see, Table 1.16). Second, the effect of more disadvantaged caste
hires on final job choices is amplified by both stronger student affinity for consult-
ing jobs (see, Table 1.11) and the rich bundle of non-pecuniary amenities offered
by such jobs as part of their overall compensation packages (see, Table 1.7).
Table 1.17 shows the effects on final job choices in the consulting sector under
the policy of providing direct cash subsidies to employers. Under this policy, final
job choices of disadvantaged castes improve between 22% to 29% when cutoffs
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adjust and do not adjust, respectively. The effects of employer cash subsidies on
final job choices of disadvantaged castes in the technology and manufacturing
sectors are smaller.
Table 1.17: Job Choices by Sector in Baseline and Counterfactuals
Job Choices by Sector
Baseline
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste ∆ Adv. Caste (%) ∆ Disadv. Caste (%)
Technology 0.52 0.48 — —
Consulting 0.63 0.37 — —
Manufacturing 0.56 0.44 — —
Employer Cash-Subsidies
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Technology 0.48 0.52 -0% +16%
Consulting 0.57 0.43 -0% +29%
Manufacturing 0.51 0.49 -0% +22%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Technology 0.48 0.52 -6% +9%
Consulting 0.56 0.44 -9% +22%
Manufacturing 0.48 0.52 -19% +12%
Pre-College Intervention
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Technology 0.50 0.50 -0% +7%
Consulting 0.61 0.39 -0% +9%
Manufacturing 0.53 0.47 -0% +10%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Technology 0.50 0.50 -3% +5%
Consulting 0.61 0.39 -3% +5%
Manufacturing 0.54 0.46 -3% +5%
Notes: Table 1.17 shows the fraction of job choices by caste in each sector under both baseline and coun-
terfactuals.
Details regarding relative performances of both policies on final job choices
within pay categories can be found in Appendix Table E.29.
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1.8.2.3 Unemployment
The policy of providing employers cash subsidies leaves fewer disadvantaged
castes without jobs than the “pre-college intervention” policy.13 As stated be-
fore, employer cash-subsidies ($2721) are worth more than 8 times the subsidy-
equivalent of equalizing the distribution of college entrance exam scores ($337).
Therefore, considerably more disadvantaged castes find jobs when employers are
provided direct cash subsidies than under the “pre-college intervention” policy.
Table 1.18 shows the effects of counterfactual hiring policies on unemployment
across castes. In the baseline, 36% of disadvantaged castes do not find jobs. Under
the policy of providing cash-subsidies to employers, unemployment among dis-
advantaged castes is between 24% to 29% when cutoffs do not adjust and adjust,
respectively. Under the “pre-college intervention” policy, unemployment among
disadvantaged castes is between 31% to 33% when cutoffs do not adjust and ad-
just, respectively.
Table 1.18: Unemployment in Baseline and Counterfactuals
Total Unemployed % Unemployed
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
Baseline 2167 2040 549 741 25% 36%
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Subsidy 2167 2040 549 483 25% 24%
PCI 2167 2040 549 631 25% 31%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Subsidy 2167 2040 719 584 33% 29%
PCI 2167 2040 597 677 28% 33%
Notes: Table 1.18 shows unemployment in the baseline and counterfactuals for advantaged and disadvantaged catses. “PCI”
stands for the pre-college intervention policy.
13I abstract away from aggregate disemployment effects financing such a policy may have.
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1.8.2.4 Earnings
Two complementary mechanisms explain the reduction in the earnings gap un-
der both policies. First, there are large increases in disadvantaged caste hires in
both the technology and consulting sectors (see, Table 1.16). Moreover, displaced
advantaged castes get, on average, slightly “worse” jobs under both policies. Sec-
ond, the comparatively higher pay and better bundle of non-pecuniary amenities
offered by jobs in the technology and consulting sectors lead to more disadvan-
taged castes choosing such jobs (see, Tables 1.6 and 1.7). Overall, both mecha-
nisms combine to explain the reduction in the earnings gap across castes under
both policies.
Since direct cash subsidies to employers are worth almost 8 times the subsidy-
equivalent of the “pre-college intervention” policy, the former policy reduces the
earnings gap across castes by substantially more than the latter policy.
Figures 1.13 and 1.14 shows the earnings gap in the baseline and the counter-
factuals. In the baseline, the earnings gap across castes is 11%. Under the policy
of providing direct cash-subsidies to employers, the earnings gap across castes is
between 6% to 8%, when cutoffs do not adjust and adjust, respectively. Under the
“pre-college intervention” policy, the earnings gap across castes is between 9% to
10%, when cutoffs do not adjust and adjust, respectively.
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Job Search Stage
Figure 1.13: Model Fit and Counterfactual Wage Gaps When Supply of Jobs is Perfectly Elastic
Notes: Figure 1.13 shows model fit and counterfactual wage gaps under both policies. ”Subsidy” refers to the policy of
providing employers cash subsidies to make them indifferent between hiring an observably identical disadvantaged and
advantaged caste. ”PCI” refers to the “pre-college intervention” policy of equalizing the distribution of pre-college skills
(entrance exam scores) across caste.
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Job Search Stage
Figure 1.14: Model Fit and Counterfactual Wage Gaps When Supply of Jobs is Perfectly Inelastic
Notes: Figure 1.14 shows model fit and counterfactual wage gaps under both policies. ”Subsidy” refers to the policy of
providing employers cash subsidies to make them indifferent between hiring an observably identical disadvantaged and
advantaged caste. ”PCI” refers to the “pre-college intervention” policy of equalizing the distribution of pre-college skills
(entrance exam scores) across caste.
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1.8.2.5 Discussion
Subsidizing employers to hire members of disadvantaged groups has parallels in
many countries, particularly in the U.S. and India. For example, The Work Oppor-
tunity Tax Credit (WOTC) in Wisconsin subsidies employers to hire welfare recip-
ients, young food stamp recipients, poor veterans and youth from disadvantaged
geographic areas. The subsidy varies according to the number of hours worked
by the employee and can be as high as 40% of the first $6,000 in earnings, result-
ing in a maximum potential subsidy of $2,400 per new hire (Hamersma, 2005). In
early 2020, the government of Kerala, a large southern state in India, announced a
wage-subsidy scheme to promote women employment in new industries (ET Bu-
reau, 2020). However, no such scheme exists for high-skilled workers belonging
to historically disadvantaged groups
While the policy of providing cash subsidies to employers increases job as-
signments and earnings of disadvantaged castes by more than the “pre-college
intervention” policy, the two policies are not necessarily independent. Improve-
ments in pre-college skills might also be a consequence of incentivizing firms to
hire more disadvantaged castes. Theoretical works have posited that affirmative
action policies might unintentionally lead to an equilibrium in which negative
perceptions regarding abilities of intended beneficiaries might prevail (Coate and
Loury, 1993; Craig and Fryer, 2018). However, empirical evidence on the effects of
affirmative action policies have suggested that such concerns might be misplaced.
Akhtari et al. (2018) show the affirmative action educational policies in the U.S.
led to an increase in pre-college human capital investment as students anticipated
increased returns to effort. In the Indian context, Khanna (2018) shows that affir-
mative action policies in government jobs increased schooling, with the average
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disadvantaged caste receiving an additional 0.8 years of education. Therefore, im-
provements in pre-college skills might also be induced by directly providing cash
subsidies to employers as disadvantaged castes, anticipating larger returns in the
labor market, increase pre-college human capital investment.
The “pre-college intervention” policy equalizes the distribution of college en-
trance exam scores across castes but keeps college GPA and the distribution of
castes within college majors the same. Keeping GPA fixed in the counterfactuals
is conservative since college GPA and college entrance exam scores are slightly
negatively correlated (see, Table 1.4; Table 1.4; Appendix Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3).
Moreover, improving the college entrance exam scores of disadvantaged castes
does not improve their representation in more selective majors since affirmative
action policies in college admissions equalize the distribution of castes within each
major and, therefore, within each cohort.
1.8.2.6 Cost-Effectiveness
The previous sections focused on comparing the absolute effects of both coun-
terfactual policies. However, policymakers might be more interested in the costs
relative to welfare gains of policies. In this section, I perform back of the enve-
lope calculations to compare the cost-effectiveness of both policies. For this pur-
pose, I use estimates from a meta-analysis comprising randomized experiments,
spanning over two decades, which evaluated the effects of pre-college interven-
tion programs on test scores of primary and secondary school students in India
(Asim et al., 2015). From this study, I find that it costs about $45 (PPP) per stu-
dent to achieve an average increase of 0.13 standard deviations in test scores. Us-
ing these estimates, I calculate the cost of improving test scores (college entrance
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exam scores) to achieve changes in job assignments and earnings of disadvan-
taged castes equivalent to those induced by direct cash subsidies to employers.
Even under extremely conservative assumptions, my results show that em-
ployer cash subsidies can be twice as cost-effective as the “’pre-college interven-
tion” policy. From Table 1.13, I calculate improvements in college entrance exam
scores (measured in standard deviation units) that would be equivalent to provid-
ing employers direct cash subsidies of 4.8% of average salary ($2721) to hire more
disadvantaged castes. Given the weights on college entrance exam scores shown
in Table 1.13, improvements in college entrance exam ranks equivalent to $2721 in
direct cash subsidies are extremely large. For B.Tech. and Dual Degree students,
improvements in college entrance exam scores of 4 and 5 standard deviations, re-
spectively, are equivalent to $2721 in employer subsidies. For both M.Tech. and
M.S. students, improvements in college entrance exam scores of a staggering 30
standard deviations are equivalent to $2721 in employer subsidies!
For the sake of argument, we will assume such large changes in college en-
trance exam scores are actually possible. To extrapolate costs of improvements in
college entrance exam scores equivalent to $2721 in employer subsidies, I will use
the cost estimate of test score increases calculated from Asim et al. (2015). Even
under the extremely conservative assumption that costs are linear in test score im-
provements (Duflo et al., 2011; Costrell et al., 2008), employer cash-subsidies are
twice as cost-effective as the “pre-college intervention” policy.
Alternatively, one could also price the “pre-college intervention” policy. The
“pre-college intervention” policy is worth a direct employer subsidy of 0.6% of av-
erage salary ($337). Improvements in college entrance exam scores equivalent to a
direct employer subsidy of $337 can be calculated from Table 1.13. For B.Tech. and
Dual Degree students, improvements in college entrance exam scores of 0.5 and
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0.6 standard deviations, respectively, are equivalent to $337 in direct employer
subsidies. For both M.Tech. and M.S. students, improvements in college entrance
exam scores of approximately 4 standard deviations are equivalent to $337 in di-
rect employer subsidies. Using cost estimates from Asim et al. (2015) and main-
taining the assumption that costs are linear in test score improvements, direct cash
subsidies to employers will still be twice as cost-effective as the “pre-college inter-
vention” policy.
While improvements in college entrance exam scores presumably increase stu-
dent productivity, providing cash-subsidies to employers does not. The cost ef-
fectiveness calculations above do not take into account the productivity offset
of improving college entrance exam scores. However, given the coefficients on
college entrance exam scores reported in Table 1.13, my estimates suggest that
the productivity offset is very small. These estimates complement recent stud-
ies evaluating labor market outcomes for college graduates in India which show
that pre-college test scores play only modest roles in determining earnings upon
graduation (Sekhri, 2020).
The cost-effectiveness comparison of the two policies reemphasises the po-
tency of providing direct cash subsidies to employers to hire more disadvantaged
castes. However, one must be judicious in drawing policy recommendations from
this paper. An erroneous conclusion to draw from the paper would be that poli-
cies for improving pre-college skills are unnecessary. As shown in this paper,
improvements in pre-college skills (college entrance exam scores) can still play
an important role in improving job assignments and earnings of disadvantaged
castes. However, at least in the short-run, this paper argues that employer cash-
subsidies are the most cost-effective methods to improve hiring diversity.
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1.9 Conclusion
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to formally study a job placement process.
Quantifying the aggregate and distributional consequences of job placement pro-
cesses is crucial. Job placement processes proposed by college career offices serve
as a critical segue between college and the first job, the long term consequences
of which have been extensively documented (Kahn et al., 2014). It is especially
important to understand the distributional effects of the job placement process I
study since 50% of job seekers belong to historically disadvantaged castes.
This paper models the job placement process of a leading post-secondary ed-
ucational institution in India and studies policies to promote hiring diversity. In
doing so, I make three main contributions. First, I quantify the earnings drop off
across castes at each stage of the job placement process, which includes job appli-
cations, pre-interview screening tests, job interviews, job offers and job choices. In
particular, I show that the compositions of job applications and job choices by stu-
dents do not explain the gaps in earnings across castes. Furthermore, using data
on outcomes from pre-interview screening tests and job interviews conducted by
firms, I show that almost all of the earnings drop off across castes occurs between
job interviews and job offers. These findings suggest that policies which provide
information about jobs, modify preferences, or improve performance at univer-
sity are unlikely to close the earnings gap. Second, guided by the sequential de-
composition of the earnings gap, I build a model of the job placement process.
The model is of general interest and can serve as a prototype for the studies of
the placement processes of engineering schools, business schools, law schools,
and other institutions that use formal job placement mechanisms. Third, I study
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policies to promote hiring diversity. For this purpose, I first estimate the model
and recover the “caste penalty” imposed by firms on disadvantaged castes. Us-
ing the model, I compare the relative efficacy of two counterfactual policies to
mitigate caste disparities in hiring. In the first policy, I subsidize firms by the
cash-equivalent amount that makes them indifferent between hiring an observ-
ably identical advantaged or disadvantaged caste. In the second policy, I equalize
the distribution of pre-college skills (college entrance exam scores) across castes.
Counterfactual simulations show that cash subsidies to employers fare substan-
tially better in improving earnings and job assignments of disadvantaged castes.
Even under extremely conservative assumptions, a back of the envelope calcula-
tion based on cost estimates of improving student test scores in India shows that
cash subsidies to employers can be twice as cost effective as the “pre-college in-
tervention” policy.
This paper also opens up many avenues for further research. For example, one
could ask what the optimal job placement mechanism would be. Theoretical first-
best mechanisms, like the one proposed by Kelso and Crawford (1982), may not
be well-suited for distributional welfare (or, equity). However, ad-hoc job place-
ment processes might sacrifice substantial aggregate welfare (or, efficiency) for
modest improvements in distributional welfare. An ideal job placement process
would balance both distributional and aggregate welfare of participants. Another
study could involve quantifying the inefficiencies (if, any) due to early matching
or unraveling. In the job placement process I study, students cannot participate in
job interviews scheduled on the next interview day conditional on receiving job
offers from firms interviewing them on the current interview day. However, it is
not obvious if such a job placement process is sub-optimal, especially if the job
placement process has distributional goals. While theoretical works positing the
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inefficiencies of unraveling in labor markets have been large, they have been so
far accompanied by a very slim body of empirical evidence. In future work, I plan
to pursue these and other related avenues of research.
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Chapter 2
Do Nice People Finish Last? Socio-Emotional Skills,
Academic Performance, Job Search, and Placements at a
Top U.S. Business School
Abstract
This paper studies how socio-emotional skills affect academic outcomes and even-
tual job placements among MBA students at a top U.S. business school. Using
detailed measures of socio-emotional traits taken before students matriculate, the
paper evaluates how such traits affects three types of outcomes: academic perfor-
mance and course choices, job search behavior, and industry and compensation
of the accepted job offer. These traits, such as compassion, gregariousness, as-
sertiveness etc., are assessed through forced-choice methods which provide ro-
bust safeguards against “gaming”. Initial descriptive results show that socio-
emotional skills are predictive of behavior in each of these three areas, commonly
out-predicting the effects of standardized test scores. Moreover, the relative im-
portance of different skills varies across the three areas of outcomes considered.
Based on the descriptive evidence, we estimate a sequential model of the key
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stages of the MBA program, including academic performance, course specializa-
tion, job search, and job placements. Using the model, we then decompose the to-
tal effects of socio-emotional skills into direct returns and indirect returns through
differences in both academic performance and job search behavior. Preliminary
descriptive results suggest that gregariousness and industriousness are important
predictors of earnings upon graduation. However, they work through different
channels: industriousness affects academic performance while gregariousness af-
fects job search behavior.
2.1 Introduction
A growing body of research shows that socio-emotional skills play an important
role in many life outcomes, such as educational attainment, areas of study, earn-
ings, and health.1 While the literature uses a variety of names, such as “soft-
skills”, “non-cognitive ability”, or “personality traits”, researchers have found
that these characteristics are relatively stable over time (Borghans et al., 2006;
Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2012), yet can also be altered through life experiences,
including direct intervention or investment2. Moreover, in many settings these
skills have been shown to be similar in importance or more important than cogni-
tive ability.3 However, little is known regarding the mechanisms through which
such skills affect socio-economic outcomes.
This paper studies how socio-emotional skills affect academic outcomes and
1See, for example Heckman et al. (2006), Lindqvist and Vestman (2011), and Heckman et al.
(2018).
2Borghans et al. (2006); Dee and West (2011); Hoeschler et al. (2018)
3See, for example Borghans et al. (2016), who find that socio-emotional skills are more impor-
tant determinants of GPA than IQ.
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eventual job placements among MBA students at a top U.S. business school. Us-
ing detailed measures of socio-emotional traits taken before students matriculate,
the paper evaluates how such traits affect (1) academic performance and student
choices such as attendance and sorting into second year courses, (2) job search
behavior including intensity of search and the targeting of specific industries, and
(3) the industry and compensation of the accepted job offer. Initial descriptive re-
sults show that socio-emotional skills are highly predictive of behavior in each of
these three areas, commonly out-predicting the effects of standardized test scores,
like GMAT and GRE, measured at approximately the same time. Moreover, we
find that the relative importance of different skills varies across the three areas of
outcomes considered.
To better understand the underlying mechanisms that cause socio-emotional
skills to predict final job placements and compensation, we build a sequential
model of choices and outcomes. This model can be expressed as a directed acyclic
graph, where socio-emotional skills can directly affect earlier choices and out-
comes, thereby changing state variables in later choices and outcomes along the
graph. For example, socio-emotional skills may directly affect first-year GPA, but
may also indirectly affect first-year GPA through impacts on class attendance.
Given that we observe many intermediate choices and outcomes for each individ-
ual, we additionally model and estimate a distribution of latent types to capture
remaining unobserved heterogeneity not captured by socio-emotional skills and
other covariates.
Using the model, we then decompose the total effect of socio-emotional skills
on final earnings and industry choice by taking the total derivative of the outcome
with respect to the various skills via simulation. By doing so, we decompose the
total effect into direct returns, indirect returns through differences in academic
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choices and GPA, and indirect returns through differences in job search behavior.
In addition, we run counterfactual simulations to study how changing cognitive
or socio-emotional skills would affect academic performance in the MBA program
and eventual job placements in partial equilibrium.
Identification of the model depends on assumptions similar to matching. How-
ever, we impose the comparatively weaker assumption that conditional indepen-
dence holds once we condition on observed covariates and modelled unobserved
types. Importantly, we assume that we can correctly estimate choice probabilities,
similar to Hotz and Miller (1993), but do not require the assumption that we have
correctly specified students’ utility functions. As noted in Benkard et al. (2018)
and Humphries et al. (2020), many economically relevant counterfactuals can be
estimated through simulation without explicitly solving the dynamic program or
taking a stand on the functional form of the utility function. While we are not
able to consider welfare, we can study the effects of counterfactual simulations on
outcomes of interest.
This paper contributes to three literatures. First, we contribute to the literature
on measuring socio-emotional skills in high-stakes settings. Scholars have high-
lighted the need to address “gaming” in high-stakes assessments of personality
traits (Furnham, 2015; Weiner and Greene, 2016). Moreover, tendencies like social
desirability bias make it hard to elicit accurate responses even when measurement
issues are alleviated (Brown, 2015). Based on these concerns, many scholars have
argued that forced-choice methods are the best way to avoid “gaming” in per-
sonality assessments (Stark et al., 2014; Salgado et al., 2015; Anguiano-Carrasco et
al., 2015). This paper provides evidence at scale that socio-emotional skills can be
measured in high-stakes settings using a forced-choice instrument, and that these
measurements are predictive of later outcomes.
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While forced choice methods are by no means perfect (Heggestad, 2006; Vasilopou-
los, 2006), many prominent psychological studies have concluded in favor of forced-
choice personality assessment tests. Stark et al. (2014) describe three of the major
personality tests developed by the U.S. Armed Services to target faking and other
response biases. The authors argue that differing correlations between personal-
ity scores and performance in the army may be driven in part by the amount of
faking in the assessments. Salgado et al. (2015) conduct a meta-analysis of the
validity of forced-choice tests across different occupations. They also examine
the validity of forced-choice tests compared to traditional, single-stimulus tests.
The authors use predictive accuracy regarding job performance as a measure of
test validity. They find forced-choice methods to be more accurate in predicting
job performance across occupations than predictions from single-stimulus tests.
Anguiano-Carrasco et al. (2015) show that forced-choice methods produced more
accurate scores than those from single-stimulus tests. Based on these results, the
authors suggest that forced-choice tests should be adopted in high-stakes situa-
tions, where subjects may have incentives to fake responses.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature studying the effects of socio-
emotional skills on educational and labor-market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006;
Lindqvist and Vestman, 2011; Thiel and Thomsen, 2013; Heckman et al., 2018).
Economists have long argued that “ability” is potentially multi-dimensional for
several decades (Becker, 1964), with growing efforts to include other dimensions
in empirical work over the last two decades (Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001;
Heckman et al., 2006). The early literature faced challenges in how to measure
skills other than cognitive skills, and many of the formative papers focused on
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adding a single second measure of non-cognitive skills.4 Further works, such as
Carneiro et al. (2007) and Humphries and Kosse (2017), provide evidence that a
single dimension of non-cognitive skills is likely insufficient to characterize the
multifaceted set of skills beyond cognition, and that different outcomes depend
on different skills.5 In addition, a number of papers find that socio-emotional
skills explain more of the variation in some outcomes than cognitive skills.6
This paper contributes to the literature on the importance of socio-emotional
skills in two ways. First, we consider the importance of these skills in the con-
text of students earning an MBA degree and finding employment. Moreover, in
addition to studying final job outcomes upon graduation, we also analyze the in-
fluence of socio-emotional skills in academic performance and in the job search
process. Second, we utilize a new high-quality behavioral assessment designed to
measure 15 different socio-emotional traits.
Third, the paper also contributes to studies of job placement processes and
the role of socio-emotional skills in job search. Recent work has studied the role
of job placement processes in determining labor market outcomes (Shukla, 2020).
Many studies have also highlighted the role of socio-emotional skills in job search
behavior (Mcfadyen and Thomas, 1997; Lavado et al., 2015; Caliendo et al., 2015;
McGee, 2015; Cuesta and Budrı́a, 2017). Our paper complements these studies
and decomposes the overall importance of cognitive and socio-emotional skills
into their relative impacts on various steps of job search among highly skilled
4See Humphries and Kosse (2017) for a review of papers using a single second measure of
non-cognitive skills.
5In behavioral economics, there is also important research on measuring socio-emotional skills
with lab experiments. Some of this work establishes a link between experimental measurements
and later-life outcomes (Chabris et al., 2008; Sutter et al., 2013; Rustichini et al., 2016).
6For example, Borghans et al. (2016) show that socio-emotional skills explain more variation
in grades than IQ.
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workers.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides details on the data and
institutional setting. Section 2.3 provides preliminary evidence on the importance
of socio-emotional skills on initial placement after the MBA program as well as in
determining academic performance and job search behavior.
2.2 Data and Institutional Details
This project uses administrative data from a top U.S. business school and focuses
on the entering classes of 2018-19 and 2019-20. The data includes demographic in-
formation on sex and race which are used as controls throughout the paper. Sim-
ilarly, the data includes verbal and quantitative GMAT (or GRE) scores for each
student. The data additionally includes information on academic performance,
pre-MBA and within-MBA labor market experience, steps taken as part of the job
search process for post-MBA employment, and placement outcomes upon gradu-
ation. Lastly, the data comprises measures of socio-emotional skills prior to when
students matriculate.
2.2.1 Academic Sorting and Outcomes
The administrative data includes detailed measures of academic performance and
choices over the two years of study. During the first year of study, all students
take the same courses. For the first year, we use information on the proportion
of classes that students attended and their overall first-year GPA. In the second
year, students select a number of elective courses which allow them to specialize.
Elective courses are in many different areas including, but not limited to, strategic
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communication, cognitive science, business planning, behavioral economics and
portfolio management. We observe which courses students take and what grades
they receive.
2.2.2 Pre-MBA and Within-MBA Labor Market Experience
Data on pre-MBA labor market experience includes details on pre-MBA intern-
ships and pre-MBA full-time employment. It is typical for students to have more
than one full-time employer before matriculating in the MBA program. For both
internships and full-time employment, the data includes information on job loca-
tion, job title, job function, and job industry.
Data on within-MBA labor market experience includes details on internships
completed enroute to the MBA degree. Students typically complete one internship
before graduating, although we see the full list of each student’s internship offers
and whether the student accepted or declined the position. The data also includes
information on job location, job title, job function and job industry, whether the
industry of the completed internship represented a career change compared to a
student’s pre-MBA labor market experience, job salary, whether or not a student
negotiated any element of the internship offer, whether or not a student received
additional funds to cover the cost of an internship, and the total amount of the
internship fund.
2.2.3 The Job Search Process for Post-MBA Employment
Job search for post-MBA employment is typically conducted through the aid of
the career office, which acts as a liaison between students and employers. While
students are also able to search for employment through other channels, the career
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office keeps detailed records on the students’ formal search process, which can be
broken down into four steps.
First, from the career office, we observe how many “employer events” stu-
dents sign up for, where an employer event is an informal networking session for
students to interact with a potential employer. By coding the industry of each em-
ployer, we can further break down the number of employer events attended by
industry.
Second, we observe information on job applications submitted through the
centralized application portal designed by the career office. The centralized portal
acts like a “one-stop” for both students and employers, facilitating coordination
across both sides of the market. Nearly every matriculated student uses the cen-
tralized portal to submit job applications to prospective employers. We are further
able to break down applications by industry.
Third, we observe detailed information on the number of subsequent inter-
view requests students receive after submitting applications, including the indus-
tries in which they receive interviews.
Fourth, we observe detailed information on the full list of job offers, and which
offer the student selects. These offers include details on the industry of the com-
pany, starting salary, job title, job function, and a brief job description. Information
regarding the characteristics of full-time job offers is typically as detailed as that
available for internships completed during the MBA program (see, Section 2.2.2).
2.2.4 Socio-emotional Skills
Prior to admissions, students complete a psychometric behavioral assessment con-
sisting of 120 questions designed to measure 15 socio-emotional traits, such as
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compassion, assertiveness, and gregariousness. The assessment is adaptive to in-
crease accuracy with a limited number of questions and was designed by a com-
mercial psychometric testing company. While the primary goal of the test was to
have a more diverse matriculating class, there are inherent challenges associated
with eliciting information on socio-emotional traits in what might be perceived as
a high-stakes situation. Students may not answer truthfully, but rather choose the
answers they believe would maximize the probability of admissions. To address
these concerns, the test uses forced-choice methods which require students to se-
lect from two or more options. All of these statements are positive, but represent
different underlying socio-emotional traits.
2.2.5 Summary Statistics
This section reports summary statistics regarding scores in standardized tests of
matriculating students and the distribution of industries hiring students from the
MBA program.
2.2.5.1 Standardized Test Scores
Students typically take the GMAT or the GRE prior to entry in the elite MBA pro-
gram. Students are highly positively selected on GMAT and GRE scores. The
average GMAT verbal score of the entire cohort is 40.39 (3.29) and the average
GMAT quantitative score of the entire cohort is 48.42 (2.42). A student with these
verbal and quantitative scores belongs to the 90th percentile of the entire distribu-
tion of overall GMAT scores. The average GRE verbal score of the entire cohort is
164.58 (4.07) and the average GRE quantitative score of the entire cohort is 163.41
(3.99). The verbal scores are in the 95th percentile of the entire distribution of GRE
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verbal scores, and the quantitative scores are in the 85th percentile of the entire
distribution of GRE quantitative scores.
2.2.5.2 Composition of Jobs by Industry
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of industries hiring students from the MBA pro-
gram. Most jobs are in the finance and consulting industry which comprise 37% of
all jobs, followed by jobs in the consumer product industry which comprise 17%
of all jobs. Other salient industries like biotechnology or healthcare, technology,
advertising or retail and government or non-profit comprise 14%, 12%, 9%, 6% of
the overall number of jobs, respectively.
Table 2.1: Composition of Jobs by Industry
Industry Percent of Sample







Notes: Table 2.1 shows the distribution of industries hiring students from the
MBA program between the years 2018-19 and 2019-20.
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2.2.6 Dimension Reduction Using Principal Component Analy-
sis (PCA)
To measure socio-emotional skills, we use a 120 question adaptive behavioral as-
sessment that is administered during the admissions process. The assessment is
designed to measure 15 socio-emotional traits which are listed in the rows of Table
2.2.
Table 2.2: PCA Loadings
Emot. Stab. Industr. Creative Gregar. Assert.
dutifulness -0.0217 0.4829 0.0798 0.3645 0.1518
intellectual integrity 0.031 0.0603 0.7287 0.0295 -0.0596
compassion -0.0359 -0.0301 0.0485 0.7379 0.0966
gregariousness 0.2916 -0.2453 -0.0111 0.6025 0.383
goal orientation -0.1757 0.4172 0.3199 0.1354 0.4862
self confidence 0.7883 -0.0593 0.1536 -0.034 0.0678
pleasantness 0.1981 0.2707 0.0699 0.6492 -0.177
assertiveness 0.1562 -0.0041 0.2111 0.1525 0.7073
controlled tempered 0.6373 0.2765 0.0455 0.2042 -0.3533
imagination 0.038 -0.0786 0.6769 0.1835 0.1087
intellect 0.1503 0.0374 0.6427 -0.1292 0.241
rule following -0.0602 0.5745 -0.1307 0.049 -0.0292
orderliness 0.0832 0.3817 -0.3764 -0.249 0.4494
self disciplined 0.1103 0.7144 0.102 -0.1192 0.013
well being 0.7316 -0.0531 -0.0056 0.1261 0.227
Notes: Table 2.2 shows PCA loadings between the reduced principal components and socio-emotional skills.
We use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensionality of
the data on socio-emotional skills. Both the Kaiser-Guttman rule (Guttman, 1954;
Kaiser, 1960) and the use of parallel analysis (Horn, 1965 and Montanelli Jr. and
Humphreys, 1976) suggest retaining five components.
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Table 2.2 shows how the five components relate to the 15 underlying socio-
emotional traits. With few exceptions, most of the 15 underlying traits only load
heavily on one of the five factors. Based on the factor loadings, we label the five
skills used in this paper: emotional stability, industriousness, creativity, gregari-
ousness, and assertiveness.
2.3 Descriptive Evidence
This section provides preliminary evidence on the importance of socio-emotional
skills on initial job placement after the MBA program as well as in determining
academic performance and job search behavior. By including controls for stan-
dardized test scores, we also provide evidence for the comparative importance of
socio-emotional skills in relation to traditional measures of cognitive ability.
2.3.1 Academic Behavior (Class Attendance and GPA)
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between socio-emotional skills and the pro-
portion of classes attended by students in the first year of the MBA program.
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between socio-emotional skills and academic
performance (GPA).7 The first figure shows that attendance is predicted by as-
sertiveness, with more assertive students missing more classes. The second figure
shows that industriousness, GMAT verbal, and GMAT quantitative scores all pre-
dict higher first-year GPA.






















































Figure 2.1: Socio-emotional skills and class absences
Figure 2.1 shows coefficients corresponding to socio-emotional skills from column 1 of the regres-
sion output reported in Appendix Table E.30. The dependent variable is absences per class. The























































Figure 2.2: Socio-emotional skills and first year GPA
Figure 2.2 shows coefficients corresponding to socio-emotional skills from column 2 of the re-
gression output reported in Appendix Table E.30. The dependent variable is first year GPA. The
regression controls for standardized test scores, gender and race.
2.3.2 Job Search Behavior
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between socio-emotional skills and job search
behavior.8 The red bars show the relationship between socio-emotional skills and
the number of employer events attended; the blue bars show the relationship be-
8Appendix Table E.31 shows the full regression table corresponding to Figure 2.3.
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tween socio-emotional skills and the number of applications submitted; and the
yellow bars show the relationship between socio-emotional skills and the num-
ber of interviews received. The figure indicates that gregariousness is a large and
statistically significant predictor of the various steps in the job search process.
Similarly, quantitative scores on the GMAT are associated with attending more




























































Figure 2.3: Socio-emotional skills and job search behavior
Figure 2.3 shows coefficients corresponding to socio-emotional skills from the regression outputs
reported in Appendix Table E.31. The dependent variable is (log) of the number of employer
event sign-ups, applications or interview invites. The regressions control for standardized test
scores, gender and race.
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2.3.3 Earnings (Internships and Full-Time Jobs)
Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between socio-emotional skills and internship
earnings. Figure 2.5 shows the relationship between socio-emotional skills and
earnings in full-time jobs received upon graduation.9 Gregariousness, creativity,
and quantitative GMAT scores are all statistically significant predictors of salaries
for internships completed after the first year of the MBA degree and are all similar
in magnitude. For full-time jobs received upon graduation, gregariousness is also
a statistically significant predictor of annual earnings, while industriousness and
verbal GMAT scores are marginally significant predictors.
9Appendix Table E.32 shows the full regression table corresponding to Figure 2.4 and Ap-































































Figure 2.4: Socio-emotional skills and internship salary
Figure 2.4 shows coefficients corresponding to socio-emotional skills from the regression outputs
reported in Appendix Table E.32. The dependent variable is (log) of salary received during intern-
ships completed after the first year of the MBA degree. The regression controls for standardized

























































Figure 2.5: Socio-emotional skills and annual pay upon graduation
Figure 2.5 shows coefficients corresponding to socio-emotional skills from the regression outputs
reported in Appendix Table E.33. The dependent variable is (log) of base annual pay in the first
job upon graduation from the MBA program. The regression controls for standardized test scores,
gender, race and industry.
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2.3.4 Discussion
The previous results provide evidence that socio-emotional skills are potentially
important determinants of earnings of MBA students upon graduation, with gre-
gariousness and industriousness notably predicting earnings. Gregariousness is
also associated with a more intensive job search behavior, which may be a key
channel through which gregariousness affects annual earnings upon graduation.
In contrast, industriousness has smaller point estimates for job search behavior
(with only a marginally significant effect on interviews), but predicts improved
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Calculation of Job Offer Probabilities
The formula for fk(Zki |Aki ) (see, Equation 1.10) can be illustrated through a simple
example. Suppose there are only two interview days and two jobs. Let Ai = (1, 1)
and Zi = (1, 0) i.e. student i applied to both jobs and received an offer only from
job j = 1. With two jobs and two days, the sets D1 and D2 comprising vectors of
indicator variables for the interview day allotment for each job have 2J = 22 = 4
elements in total i.e.












(1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0), (1, 1)
}
.
Consider an element D11 = (1, 0) ∈ D1 which denotes the event that job j = 1 was
given interview day k = 1 while job j = 2 was not. Then, A1i = Ai × D11 = (1, 0),
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Z1i = Zi × D11 = (1, 0) and
fk(Zki |Aki ) = f1(Z1i |A1i ) = f1((1, 0)|(1, 0)).
= πi1 · 1.
= πi1.
where the third equality above follows from Equation 1.10. In the above example,
even though the student applied to both jobs overall, the day 1 application set of
student i is A1i = (1, 0) i.e. the student applied to only one job (j = 1) which was
given a day 1 interview slot. Given his day 1 application set, the student gets an
offer from job j = 1 with probability πi1 and does not get an offer from job j = 2
with probability 1 since his day 1 application set has no application for job j = 2.
Note that in the formula for fk(Zki |Aki ) we are assuming that jobs allotted the same
interview day make offers independently (see, Equation 1.10). The assumption of
independent offers on the same interview day is plausible since all daywise offers
are announced within a short interval of time after all jobs have conducted their
interviews (see, Section 1.3.2).
As another example, consider another element D14 = (1, 1) ∈ D1 which de-
notes the event that both jobs were given a day 1 interview slot. Then, A1i =
Ai × D14 = (1, 1), Z1i = Zi × D14 = (1, 0) and
fk(Zki |Aki ) = f1(A1i |Z1i ) = f1((1, 0)|(1, 1)).
= πi1 · (1− πi2).
where the third equality above follows from Equation 1.10. In this example, the
day 1 application set of student i is A1i = (1, 1) which coincides with his overall
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application set. Given his day 1 application set, the student gets an offer from job
j = 1 with probability πi1 and does not get an offer from job j = 2 with probability
(1− πi2).
A.1 Job Offer Probabilities
For this section, suppose there are only 2 jobs and 2 interview days. From Ap-
pendix Tables E.20 and E.21, it is reasonable to assume interview day allotments
to jobs as exogenous. However, for the purposes of the illustration of the formula
for job offer probabilities, it will be easier to also assign probabilities to interview
day allotments. Recall that Zi the offer vector for student i and Ai is the applica-
tion vector for student i. Let f (Zi|Ai) denote the probability of realizing Zi given
Ai. Then, f (Zi|Ai) is defined as
f (Zi |Ai) =

∏l=0,1,...,K f̃l((0, 0, . . . , 0)︸           ︷︷           ︸
J
|Ai) if Zij = 0 ∀j
∑Kk=1
(










where f̃l((0, 0, . . . , 0)︸         ︷︷         ︸
J
|Ai) = ∑{m:(0, 0, . . . , 0)︸           ︷︷           ︸
J





is the probability of not getting any offer on interview day l, m = 1, . . . , 2|{1,...,J}|
and Dlm is defined as in section A.
For completeness,
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• Let f̃0((0, 0, . . . , 0)︸           ︷︷           ︸
J
|Ai) = 1.
• If, for a given k, there is no such m such that Zi × Dkm = Zki , then set
∑{m:Zi×Dkm=Zki }
Pr(Dkm) fk(Zki |Aki ) = 0.
The term ∏l=0,1,...,k−1 f̃l((0, 0, . . . , 0)︸           ︷︷           ︸
J
|Ai) is the probability that student i is eli-
gible for a job offer on interview day k.




f (Zi|Ai) = 1. (A.2)
For convenience, I set some values for each of Pr(Dkl ) where k = 1, 2 and l =














(1, 0)︸  ︷︷  ︸
0.2
,
0.4︷  ︸︸  ︷
(0, 1), (0, 0)︸  ︷︷  ︸
0.2
,















{ 0.4︷  ︸︸  ︷
(1, 0), (0, 1)︸  ︷︷  ︸
0.2
,
0.2︷  ︸︸  ︷




The probabilities are denoted above each element belonging to the interview al-
lotment set Dk for k = 1, 2. For example, Pr(D11) = 0.2, Pr(D
2
1) = 0.4 and so on.
Note that with 2 jobs and 2 interview days, the event (0, 1)11 is the same as the
1(1, 0)1 is shorthand for (1, 0) ∈ D1. Similarly, (1, 0)2 is shorthand for (1, 0) ∈ D2.
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event (1, 0)2 i.e. if job j = 2 gets allotted the first interview day and job j = 1 does
not, then job j = 1 will get allotted the second interview day since each job must
get allotted one (and, only one) interview day. Additionally, we will assume that
πi1 = π
i
2 = π where π
i
j is the probability that jobs j = 1, 2 make offers to applicant
i (this is not essential but makes the exposition which follows simpler). We use
the formula for fk(Zki |Aki ) in Equation 1.10 to calculate f (Zi|Ai) in Equation A.1
for each of the following cases:
(1) Zi = (1, 0).
Following Equation A.1, I first calculate the inner sum i.e. ∑{m:Zi×Dkm=Zi} Pr(D
k
m)
fk(Zki |Aki ) for each k = 1, 2. From the definitions of D1 and D2 in Equation
A.3 above, it follows that
• For k = 1
∑
{m:Zi×D1m=(1,0)}
Pr(D1m) f1((1, 0)|A1i ).
= Pr(D11) f1((1, 0)|A1i ) + Pr(D14) f1((1, 0)|A1i ).
= 0.2 f1((1, 0)|(1, 0)) + 0.2 f1((1, 0)|(1, 1)).
= 0.2π + 0.2π(1− π) = 0.4π − 0.2π2.
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• For k = 2
∑
{m:Zi×D2m=(1,0)}
Pr(D2m) f2((1, 0)|A2i ).
= Pr(D21) f2((1, 0)|A2i ) + Pr(D24) f2((1, 0)|A2i ).
= 0.4 f2((1, 0)|(1, 0)) + 0.2 f2((1, 0)|(1, 1)).
= 0.4π + 0.2π(1− π) = 0.6π − 0.2π2.
Recall that f̃0((0, 0)|Ai) = 1.
To calculate f̃1((0, 0)|Ai), I use the following formula:
f̃1((0, 0)|Ai) = ∑
{m:(0,0)×D1m=(0,0)}
Pr(D1m) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
= Pr(D11) f1((0, 0)|A1i ) + Pr(D12) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
+ Pr(D13) f1((0, 0)|A1i ) + Pr(D14) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
= 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(1, 0)) + 0.4 f1((0, 0)|(0, 1)) + 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(0, 0))
+ 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(1, 1)).
= 0.2(1− π) + 0.4(1− π) + 0.2 + 0.2(1− π)2.
= 1− π + 0.2π2.
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Hence, for Ai = (1, 1) and Zi = (1, 0)





















Pr(D1m) f1((1, 0)|A1i )
]







Pr(D2m) f2((1, 0)|A2i )
]
︸                                                                      ︷︷                                                                      ︸
k=2
.
= (0.4π − 0.2π2) + [1− π + 0.2π2](0.6π − 0.2π2).
(2) Zi = (1, 1).
Following Equation A.1, I first calculate the inner sum i.e. ∑{m:Zi×Dkm=Zi} Pr(D
k
m)
fk(Zki |Aki ) for each k = 1, 2. From the definitions of D1 and D2 from Equa-
tion A.3, it follows that
• For k = 1
∑
{m:Zi×D1m=(1,1)}
Pr(D1m) f1((1, 1)|A1i ).
= Pr(D14) f1((1, 1).|A1i )
= 0.2 f1((1, 1)|(1, 1)).
= 0.2π2.
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• For k = 2
∑
{m:Zi×D2m=(1,1)}
Pr(D2m) f2((1, 1)|A2i ).
= Pr(D24) f2((1, 1)|A2i ).
= 0.2 f2((1, 1)|(1, 1)).
= 0.2π2.
Recall that f̃0((0, 0)|Ai) = 1.
To calculate f̃1((0, 0)|Ai), I use the following formula:
f̃1((0, 0)|Ai) = ∑
{m:(0,0)×D1m=(0,0)}
Pr(D1m) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
= Pr(D11) f1((0, 0)|A1i ) + Pr(D12) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
+ Pr(D13) f1((0, 0)|A1i ) + Pr(D14) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
= 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(1, 0)) + 0.4 f1((0, 0)|(0, 1)) + 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(0, 0))
+ 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(1, 1)).
= 0.2(1− π) + 0.4(1− π) + 0.2 + 0.2(1− π)2.
= 1− π + 0.2π2.
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Hence, for Ai = (1, 1) and Zi = (1, 1)





















Pr(D1m) f1((1, 1)|A1i )
]







Pr(D2m) f2((1, 1)|A2i )
]
︸                                                                      ︷︷                                                                      ︸
k=2
.
= 0.2π2 + [1− π + 0.2π2]0.2π2.
(3) Zi = (0, 1).
Following Equation A.1, I first calculate the inner sum i.e. ∑{m:Zi×Dkm=Zi} Pr(D
k
m)
fk(Zki |Aki ) for each k = 1, 2. From the definitions of D1 and D2 from Equa-
tion A.3 above, it follows that
• For k = 1
∑
{m:Zi×D1m=(0,1)}
Pr(D1m) f1((0, 1)|A1i ).
= Pr(D12) f1((0, 1)|A1i ) + Pr(D14) f1((0, 1)|A1i ).
= 0.4 f1((0, 1)|(0, 1)) + 0.2 f1((0, 1)|(1, 1)).
= 0.4π + 0.2π(1− π) = 0.6π − 0.2π2.
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• For k = 2
∑
{m:Zi×D2m=(0,1)}
Pr(D2m) f2((0, 1)|A2i ).
= Pr(D22) f2((0, 1)|A2i ) + Pr(D24) f2((0, 1)|A2i ).
= 0.2 f2((0, 1)|(0, 1)) + 0.2 f2((0, 1)|(1, 1)).
= 0.2π + 0.2π(1− π) = 0.4π − 0.2π2.
Recall that f̃0((0, 0)|Ai) = 1.
To calculate f̃1((0, 0)|Ai), I use the following formula:
f̃1((0, 0)|Ai) = ∑
{m:(0,0)×D1m=(0,0)}
Pr(D1m) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
= Pr(D11) f1((0, 0)|A1i ) + Pr(D12) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
+ Pr(D13) f1((0, 0)|A1i ) + Pr(D14) f1((0, 0)|A1i ).
= 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(1, 0)) + 0.4 f1((0, 0)|(0, 1)) + 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(0, 0))
+ 0.2 f1((0, 0)|(1, 1)).
= 0.2(1− π) + 0.4(1− π) + 0.2 + 0.2(1− π)2.
= 1− π + 0.2π2.
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Hence, for Ai = (1, 1) and Zi = (0, 1)





















Pr(D1m) f1((0, 1)|A1i )
]







Pr(D2m) f2((0, 1)|A2i )
]
︸                                                                      ︷︷                                                                      ︸
k=2
.
= (0.6π − 0.2π2) + [1− π + 0.2π2](0.4π − 0.2π2).
(4) Zi = (0, 0).
From Equation A.1 above, it follows that
f ((0, 0)|(1, 1)) = ∏
l=0,1,2
f̃l((0, 0)|Ai).
= f̃0((0, 0)|Ai)× f̃1((0, 0)|Ai)× f̃2((0, 0)|Ai).
= f̃1((0, 0)|Ai)× f̃2((0, 0))|Ai).
= (1− π + 0.2π2) · (1− π + 0.2π2).
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since
f̃2((0, 0)|Ai) = ∑
{m:(0,0)×D2m=(0,0)}
Pr(D2m) f2((0, 0)|A2i ).
= Pr(D21) f2((0, 0)|A2i ) + Pr(D22) f2((0, 0)|A2i ).
+ Pr(D23) f2((0, 0)|A2i ) + Pr(D24) f2((0, 0)|A2i ).
= 0.4 f2((0, 0)|(1, 0)) + 0.2 f2((0, 0)|(0, 1)) + 0.2 f2((0, 0)|(0, 0))
+ 0.2 f2((0, 0)|(1, 1)).
= 0.4(1− π) + 0.2(1− π) + 0.2 + 0.2(1− π)2.
= 1− π + 0.2π2.
Also, f̃1((0, 0)|Ai) = 1 − π + 0.2π2 from the calculations above. Collecting all
terms and recalling that Ai = (1, 1), it follows that
∑
Zi
f (Zi|Ai) = f ((1, 0)|(1, 1)) + f ((1, 1)|(1, 1)) + f ((0, 1)|(1, 1)) + f ((0, 0)|(1, 1)).
= (0.4π − 0.2π2) + [1− π + 0.2π2](0.6π − 0.2π2)︸                                                                  ︷︷                                                                  ︸
f ((1,0)|(1,1))
+ 0.2π2 + [1− π + 0.2π2](0.2π2)︸                                         ︷︷                                         ︸
f ((1,1)|(1,1)))
+ (0.6π − 0.2π2) + [1− π + 0.2π2](0.4π − 0.2π2)︸                                                                  ︷︷                                                                  ︸
f ((0,1)|(1,1))
+ (1− π + 0.2π2) · (1− π + 0.2π2)︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
f ((0,0)|(1,1))
.
= [1− π + 0.2π2]
(




+ 0.4π − 0.2π2 + 0.2π2 + 0.6π − 0.2π2.
= 1− π + 0.2π2 + 0.4π − 0.2π2 + 0.2π2 + 0.6π − 0.2π2 = 1.
Clearly, f (Zi|Ai) ≥ 0 for any offer vector Zi and any application vector Ai.
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Appendix B
Estimation Details and Standard Errors
Let θ denote the parameters to be estimated. The complete likelihood contribution
of student i with endogenous job offers and job choices, (Z∗i , C
∗
i ), is given by
Li(Z∗i , C∗i |Ai, Xi, θ) =
∫
q
f (Z∗i |Ai, Xi, q, θ)× Pr(C∗i = j|Z∗i , Xi, q, θ)dF(q|θ). (B.1)
where Ai is the application vector for student i and Xi is the vector of all exoge-
nous characteristics entering the likelihood function of student i.








where R is the total number of simulation draws. The maximum simulated likeli-
hood (MSL) estimator is then defined by


























If R rises at any rate with N, the MSL estimator is consistent. If R rises faster
than
√
N, the MSL estimator is
√
N-consistent and has the same distribution as
the conventional maximum likelihood estimator (Train, 2003).
I calculate standard errors using the information identity. By the information
identity, the sample hessian, Ĥ, can be computed by the average outer product of







∇θlog L̂i(θ̂MSL)∇θlog L̂i(θ̂MSL)′. (B.4)
Then, Ĥ−1 is a consistent estimate of the variance of
√
N(θ̂MSL − θ∗), where θ∗ is




The presence of a large number of jobs in my institutional setting makes it chal-
lenging to incorporate job application behavior in the main model. As shown in
Section 1.4.2, the differences in the compositions of job applications across castes
are not economically significant. Hence, I do not model job applications in the
main model. However, I show below that the model can be extended to incor-
porate job application behavior as well. Therefore, the decision to omit job ap-
plications is not a restriction on the generality of the model of the job placement
process.
C.1 Choosing Jobs Instead of Job Portfolios
The key trick in modeling job application behavior is to convert the student’s
search from one over potential job application portfolios to one over jobs. The in-
tuition is simple: for any job a student applied to, the expected marginal benefit
from adding the job to his application vector should exceed the cost of applying
to the job. Similarly, for any job a student did not apply to, the expected marginal
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benefit from adding the job to his application vector should be lower than the cost
of applying to the job.
Following the notation in Howell (2010), define
Ai/k =
{m|m ∈ Ai, m , k} if k ∈ Ai{m|m ∈ Ai} ∪ {k} if k < Ai (C.1)
Then, it must be true that
MVi/k > 0 ∀k ∈ Ai (C.2)
MVi/p < 0 ∀p < Ai (C.3)
To make the computation tractable, one proceeds by reducing the search space by
eliminating dominated strategies. Following Howell (2010), we categorize strate-
gies into four main categories: adjacent, non-adjacent, single-swap and multiple-
swap strategies. Consider an application vector, Ai = {Goldman Sachs, Microsoft,
Google}. Then,
(i) Removing “Goldman Sachs” from the application vector is an adjacent strat-
egy.
(ii) Removing both “Goldman Sachs” and “Google” from the application vector
is a non-adjacent strategy.
(iii) Replacing “Goldman Sachs” with “Facebook” in the application vector is a
single-swap strategy.
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(iv) Replacing “Goldman Sachs” and “Microsoft” with “Facebook” and ”Uber”
in the application vector is a multiple-swap strategy.
Howell (2010) shows that if a student’s application strategy is preferred to all ad-
jacent and single-swap strategies, then it will also be preferred to all non-adjacent
and multiple-swap strategies. Hence, to begin with, a student only needs to ex-
amine J application patterns and find the first job to apply to. Next, he needs
evaluate J− 1 applications and find the second job to apply to and so on. At most,
he needs to evaluate a total of J + (J − 1) + · · · + 2 + 1 = J(J+1)2 applications.
The complexity of the problem is reduced dramatically. When searching over job
portfolios, the complexity of the problem is O(2J), where J is the number of jobs.
However, when searching over jobs, the complexity of the problem is only O(J),
where J is the number of jobs. A similar idea is used in the Marginal Improvement
Algorithm (MIA) studied by Chade and Smith (2006).
The cost of job applications can be modeled in the following manner. The cost
function c(a, Xi, ηi) comprises a fixed and a marginal cost component. In particu-
lar,1
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+|a| × exp(δm0 + Xi
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where Xi are the covariates of student i and |a| = ∑Jj=1 aj is the total number
of applications. The unobserved cost ηij is incurred for all applications in which
aj = 1 i.e. for all firms j to which a student submits an application.
Then, by using a logit kernel smoother (Train, 2003), one can show that
1Note that modeling application behavior à la Howell (2010) would not identify fixed costs.
However, I include the fixed cost term in Equation C.4 above for illustrative purposes.
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where λ > 0 is a scale parameter chosen by the researcher.
Finally, following Kapor (2020), we can extend the definition of the equilibrium in
Section 1.5.4 and include application choices as part of the equilibrium tuple.
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Appendix D
Institutional Setting and Data
This paper uses administrative data collected by the career office of a leading post-
secondary educational institution in India. The career office collects information
on job applications, pre-interview screening tests, job interviews, job offers and job
choices. The career office also makes rules regarding the job placement process
and requires that students and firms abide by them. Section 1.3.2 lays out the
rules of the job placement process in my institutional setting. The job placement
rules delineated by the career office are similar to those followed by most post-
secondary and post-graduate engineering institutions, M.B.A. programs and law
schools in India. The administrative dataset has detailed information on students
and firms.
Pre-College Skills
The administrative dataset has detailed information on the pre-college skills of
students. Pre-college skills include entrance exam scores which are the basis of
admissions to the post-secondary educational institution. These entrance exam
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scores are analogous to S.A.T. and A.C.T. scores used for undergraduate admis-
sions in the United States. I also have information on scores from national-level
board examinations completed in the 10th and the 12th grades.
Within-College Performance
The administrative dataset has detailed information on within-college performance
of students. Measures of within-college performance include college GPA, college
major and college degree and coursework. For Master’s degree holders, I have
additional information on undergraduate institution, undergraduate degree, un-
dergraduate major and specialization within degree (e.g. computational fluid me-
chanics, solid mechanics, aircraft propulsion etc.). Most Master’s degree students
choose to write senior projects on their degree specialization. I have information
on the main focus of their senior projects (“experimental fluid mechanics with a
focus on interfacial phenomena”), keywords from their senior projects (“surface
phenomena contact, angle hysteresis, wetting angle characterization”), whether
the projects were experimental or analytical or both (“experimental and analyti-
cal”) and their software programming skills (“Fortran and MATLAB”). Bachelor’s
degree holders do not have additional specialization within the major but some-
times combine their Bachelor’s degree with a one-year Master’s program, and
graduate in five years. While I do not have measures of software programming
skills or degree specialization for Bachelor’s degree holders, I can directly proxy
for relevant on-the-job skills by including dummies for getting past the written
test, group discussion and the one-on-one interview stages.
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Previous Labor Market Experience
For both Bachelor’s and Master’s degree holders, I have detailed information on
both summer and winter internships completed by students. Internship informa-
tion includes employment durations, job salaries, job locations, job sectors and
detailed job descriptions. Internship job descriptions include eligibility criterion,
desired skills and expectations on the job. For Master’s degree holders, I also
have information on previous full-time job employments, including employment
durations, job salaries, job locations, job sectors, detailed job descriptions, spe-
cialization within the major (like, computational fluid mechanics) and software
programming skills.
Job Characteristics
A “job” means a job designation within a firm. For example, a firm can hire for
both engineering and managerial positions. I have access to detailed job descrip-
tions. Job descriptions include job designations, job salaries, job locations, desired
skills, expectations on the job and details on non-pecuniary amenities. Job salaries
typically vary across but not within college degrees (see, 1.3.3.4). Job salaries do
not vary across majors, caste or gender. Non-pecuniary amenities or fringe ben-
efits include stocks, signing bonuses, performance bonuses, medical insurance,
relocation allowances etc. I also have dollar amounts for how much a job pays as




Key demographic variables include gender and caste.
Job Applications
The administrative dataset has detailed information on job applications. Students
apply for jobs through a centralized job application portal. Applying to a job in-
volves clicking on the name of the job in the application portal. Job applications do
not require additional cover letters or other statements. Employers only request
curriculum vitae which are uploaded by students on the centralized application
portal. Eligibility for a job depends upon a combination of major, degree and GPA.
We also have information regarding each job’s eligibility criterion.
Pre-Interview Screening Tests
Pre-interview screening tests often involve both written and verbal components.
The written component is a timed aptitude test. The verbal component, also called
group discussion (GD), tests students’ ability to effectively communicate among
their peers on a given topic. While I do not have access to scores on pre-interview
screening tests, I have data on the final outcomes i.e. whether or not the student
progressed forward. (see, Section 1.4.3).
Job Interviews
I have access to data on outcomes from job interviews (see, Section 1.4.3). Job




I have access to data on job offers. Job offers are given to students in accordance
with the rules of the placement process (see, Section 1.3.2).
Job Choices




Table E.1: GPA for Dual Degree Students Negatively Correlated with Entrance Exam Score
Dependent Variable: (log) GPA
Coefficient All Non-Selective Majors Selective Majors
Disadv. Caste −0.147∗∗∗ (0.009) −0.140∗∗∗ (0.012) −0.155∗∗∗ (0.014)
Entrance Exam Score −0.029∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.021∗∗ (0.010) −0.036∗∗∗ (0.007)
N 1239 780 459
R2 0.221 0.190 0.276
Adjusted R2 0.212 0.182 0.262
Notes: Table E.1 includes estimates from a regression of grade point averages (GPA) of Dual degree holders on student characteristics.
Dependent variable is (log) GPA. Controls include college major, entrance exam score (standardized) and grades in 10th and 12th grade
national level examinations (standardized). College major includes dummies for each major. College entrance exam scores (ranks) have
been re-normalized so that higher numbers are better. In column (1), I report results for all students. In column (2), I report results
only for students in non-selective majors. In column (3), I report results only for students in selective majors. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05;
***p < 0.01.. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.2: GPA for M.Tech. Degree Students Negatively Correlated with Entrance Exam Score
Dependent Variable: (log) GPA
Coefficient All Non-Selective Majors Selective Majors
Disadv. Caste −0.071∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.078∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.048∗∗∗ (0.013)
Entrance Exam Score −0.033∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.042∗∗∗ (0.011) −0.022∗∗∗ (0.004)
N 1202 840 362
R2 0.245 0.271 0.206
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.264 0.183
Notes: Table E.2 includes estimates from a regression of grade point averages (GPA) of M.Tech. degree holders on student character-
istics. Dependent variable is (log) GPA. Controls include college major, entrance exam score (standardized) and grades in 10th and
12th grade national level examinations (standardized). College major includes dummies for each major. College entrance exam scores
(ranks) have been re-normalized so that higher numbers are better. In column (1), I report results for all students. In column (2), I
report results only for students in non-selective majors. In column (3), I report results only for students in selective majors. *p < 0.1;
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table E.3: GPA for M.S. Degree Students Negatively Correlated with Entrance Exam Score
Dependent Variable: (log) GPA
Coefficient All Non-Selective Majors Selective Majors
Disadv. Caste −0.011∗ (0.056) −0.019∗∗ (0.008) 0.003 (0.011)
Entrance Exam Score −0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.004 (0.010) −0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
N 477 322 155
R2 0.076 0.055 0.157
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.031 0.098
Notes: Table E.3 includes estimates from a regression of grade point averages (GPA) of Master of Science (M.S.) degree holders on
student characteristics. Dependent variable is (log) GPA. Controls include college major, entrance exam score (standardized) and
grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations (standardized). College major includes dummies for each major. College
entrance exam scores (ranks) have been re-normalized so that higher numbers are better. In column (1), I report results for all students.
In column (2), I report results only for students in non-selective majors. In column (3), I report results only for students in selective
majors. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.4: Earnings Gap with Score Quantiles
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Rank Quartile Rank Quintile Rank Decile
Disadv. Caste −0.113∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.111∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.112∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.106∗∗∗ (0.015)
N 2927 2927 2927 2927
R2 0.452 0.448 0.449 0.452
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.442 0.443 0.445
Notes: Table E.4 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs. Dependent variable is log earnings. Controls
include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and previous
labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree includes dummies for each
degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), dummies for entrance exam score quartiles are included. In column
(3), dummies for entrance exam score quintiles are included. In column (4), dummies for entrance exam score deciles are included. Full regression results are available on
request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table E.5: Earnings Gap with Fully-Flexible Polynomials
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Splines
Disadv. Caste −0.113∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.105∗∗∗ (0.017) −0.104∗∗∗ (0.019) −0.104∗∗∗ (0.024)
N 2927 2927 2927 2927
R2 0.452 0.532 0.553 0.578
Adjusted R2 0.447 0.486 0.490 0.497
Notes: Table E.5 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs. Dependent variable is log earnings. Controls
include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and previous
labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree includes dummies for each
degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic polynomial regression is estimated with all
possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column
(4), a natural cubic spline regression with three degrees of freedom is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. The results are robust to other reasonable
choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available on request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.6: Average GPA of Students versus those of Students Without Jobs
Bachelor of Technology (B.Tech.) Degree
Overall Students Without Jobs
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
8.08 7.00 7.97 6.58∗∗∗
Dual Degree
Overall Students Without Jobs
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
8.05 7.15 8.02 6.86∗∗
Master of Technology (M.Tech.) Degree
Overall Students Without Jobs
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
8.33 7.62 8.00∗∗∗ 7.35∗∗∗
Master of Science (M.S.) Degree
Overall Students Without Jobs
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
8.49 8.42 8.46 8.23∗
Notes: Table E.6 compares the average GPA of students versus those of students without jobs. T-tests are conducted for differences in overall means versus means of students without jobs within each
caste. Significance denoted by asterisks are shown in the third and fourth columns. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.7: Average Entrance Exam Scores of Students versus those of Students Without Jobs
Bachelor of Technology (B.Tech.) Degree
Overall Students Without Jobs
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
-1617.89 -3707.45 −1879.32∗ −4315.18∗∗
Dual Degree
Overall Students Without Jobs
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
-2096.60 -4067.13 −2602.79∗∗∗ −5743.80∗∗∗
Master of Technology (M.Tech.) Degree
Overall Students Without Jobs
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
-653.94 -2445.64 −1052.61∗∗∗ −3310.677∗∗
Master of Science (M.S.) Degree
Overall Students Without Jobs
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste
-558.94 -1416.09 -642.18 -1411.26
Notes: Table E.7 compares the average entrance exam scores (ranks) of students versus those of students without jobs. Ranks have been re-normalized so that higher numbers are better. T-tests are
conducted for differences in overall means versus means of students without jobs within each caste. Significance denoted by asterisks are shown in the third and fourth columns. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05;
***p < 0.01.
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Table E.8: Salaries of Jobs to Which Students Applied with Fully-Flexible Polynomials
Dependent Variable: Log Avg. Salary of Jobs Applied to (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Splines
Disadv. Caste −0.001 (0.007) −0.001 (0.007) −0.001 (0.008) −0.001 (0.007)
N 4207 4207 4207 4207
R2 0.554 0.613 0.631 0.625
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.585 0.587 0.395
Notes: Table E.8 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs. Dependent variable is log average salary of
jobs to which students applied. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade
national level examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major.
College degree includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic
polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible
interactions between controls. In column (4), estimates from a natural cubic spline with three degrees of freedom are reported. The results are robust to other reasonable
choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available on request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table E.9: No. of Jobs to Which Students Applied Fully-Flexible Polynomials
Dependent Variable: Log No. of Jobs Applied to
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Splines
Disadv. Caste −0.012 (0.033) −0.034 (0.034) −0.038 (0.037) −0.034 (0.033)
N 4207 4207 4207 4207
R2 0.248 0.427 0.443 0.446
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.385 0.388 0.395
Notes: Table E.9 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs. Dependent variable is log number of firms
to which students applied. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade
national level examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major.
College degree includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic
polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible
interactions between controls. In column (4), estimates from a natural cubic spline with three degrees of freedom are reported. The results are robust to other reasonable
choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available on request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.10: Earnings Gap in the Manufacturing Sector
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Splines
Disadv. Caste −0.044∗ (0.023) −0.037 (0.028) −0.050 (0.032) −0.041 (0.033)
N 789 789 789 789
R2 0.258 0.502 0.593 0.601
Adjusted R2 0.230 0.312 0.349 0.362
Notes: Table E.10 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs in the technology sector. Dependent variable
is log earnings. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level
examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree
includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic polynomial
regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions
between controls. In column (4), a fully-flexible natural cubic spline regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. The results are robust to other
reasonable choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available upon request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table E.11: Earnings Gap in the Technology Sector
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Splines
Disadv. Caste −0.080∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.077∗∗∗ (0.028) −0.061∗ (0.033) −0.071∗∗ (0.033)
N 1435 1435 1435 1435
R2 0.418 0.535 0.574 0.575
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.438 0.443 0.446
Notes: Table E.11 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs in the technology sector. Dependent variable
is log earnings. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level
examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree
includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic polynomial
regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions
between controls. In column (4), a fully-flexible natural cubic spline regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. The results are robust to other
reasonable choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available upon request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.12: Earnings Gap in the Consulting Sector
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Splines
Disadv. Caste −0.102∗∗∗ (0.033) −0.104∗∗∗ (0.033) −0.102∗∗∗ (0.032) −0.102∗∗∗ (0.033)
N 703 703 703 703
R2 0.475 0.613 0.663 0.667
Adjusted R2 0.454 0.473 0.495 0.498
Notes: Table E.12 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with jobs in the consulting sector. Dependent variable
is log earnings. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level
examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree
includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic polynomial
regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions
between controls. In column (4), a fully-flexible natural cubic spline regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. The results are robust to other
reasonable choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available upon request. p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.13: Offer Probabilities for Jobs in the Technology Sector
Dependent Variable: Got an Offer
Coefficient LPM Logit Probit
Disadv. Caste 0.039∗∗ (0.016) 0.037∗∗ (0.016) 0.036∗∗ (0.015)
N 3974 3974 3974
R2 0.187 0.156 0.157
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.146 0.146
Notes: Table E.13 includes estimates from linear probability, logit and probit models. Dependent variable is whether or not a student
got an offer from a job in the technology sector. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score,
pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and previous labor market experience including
details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree includes dummies for each
degree. In column (1), a linear probability model (LPM) is estimated. In column (2), a logit model is estimated. In column (3), a probit
model is estimated. Pseudo R2 is reported for logit and probit regressions. Full regression results are available on request. p < 0.1;
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table E.14: Offer Probabilities for Jobs in the Consulting Sector
Dependent Variable: Got an Offer
Coefficient LPM Logit Probit
Disadv. Caste −0.081∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.087∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.082∗∗∗ (0.015)
N 3610 3610 3610
R2 0.142 0.160 0.159
Adjusted R2 0.136 0.146 0.145
Notes: Table E.14 includes estimates from linear probability, logit and probit models. Dependent variable is whether or not a student
got an offer from a job in the consulting sector. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score,
pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and previous labor market experience including
details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree includes dummies for each
degree. In column (1), a linear probability model (LPM) is estimated. In column (2), a logit model is estimated. In column (3), a probit
model is estimated. Pseudo R2 is reported for logit and probit regressions. Full regression results are available on request. p < 0.1;
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.15: Offer Probabilities for Jobs in the Manufacturing Sector
Dependent Variable: Got an Offer
Coefficient LPM Logit Probit
Disadv. Caste 0.015 (0.015) 0.016 (0.015) 0.015 (0.015)
N 3563 3563 3563
R2 0.114 0.122 0.122
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.108 0.108
Notes: Table E.15 includes estimates from linear probability, logit and probit models. Dependent variable is whether or not a student
got an offer from a job in the manufacturing sector. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score,
pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and previous labor market experience including
details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree includes dummies for each
degree. In column (1), a linear probability model (LPM) is estimated. In column (2), a logit model is estimated. In column (3), a probit
model is estimated. Pseudo R2 is reported for logit and probit regressions. Full regression results are available on request. p < 0.1;
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.16: Offer Probabilities in Client Facing Jobs
Dependent Variable: Got an Offer
Coefficient LPM Logit Probit
Disadv. Caste −0.083∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.087∗∗∗ (0.015) −0.084∗∗∗ (0.015)
N 3751 3751 3751
R2 0.159 0.171 0.169
Adjusted R2 0.153 0.159 0.156
Notes: Table E.16 includes estimates from linear probability, logit and probit models. Dependent variable is whether or not a student
got a client facing job. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including
grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and
winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree includes dummies for each degree. In column (1),
a linear probability model (LPM) is estimated. In column (2), a logit model is estimated. In column (3), a probit model is estimated.
Pseudo R2 is reported for logit and probit regressions. Full regression results are available on request. p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table E.17: Offer Probabilities in Non-Client Facing Jobs
Dependent Variable: Got an Offer
Coefficient LPM Logit Probit
Disadv. Caste 0.063∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.016)
N 4109 4109 4109
R2 0.142 0.120 0.120
Adjusted R2 0.136 0.111 0.111
Notes: Table E.17 includes estimates from linear probability, logit and probit models. Dependent variable is whether or not a student got
a non-client facing job. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including
grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and
winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree includes dummies for each degree. In column (1),
a linear probability model (LPM) is estimated. In column (2), a logit model is estimated. In column (3), a probit model is estimated.
Pseudo R2 is reported for logit and probit regressions. Full regression results are available on request. p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.18: Earnings Gap in Client Facing Jobs
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Splines
Disadv. Caste −0.105∗∗∗ (0.030) −0.121∗∗∗ (0.037) −0.126∗∗∗ (0.045) −0.123∗∗∗ (0.031)
N 822 822 822 822
R2 0.424 0.554 0.599 0.601
Adjusted R2 0.404 0.417 0.435 0.436
Notes: Table E.18 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with client facing jobs. Dependent variable is log
earnings. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level
examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree
includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic polynomial
regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions
between controls. In column (4), a fully-flexible natural cubic spline regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. The results are robust to other
reasonable choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available upon request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Table E.19: Earnings Gap in Non-Client Facing Jobs
Dependent Variable: Log Earnings (USD PPP)
Coefficient Linear Quadratic Cubic Splines
Disadv. Caste −0.080∗∗∗ (0.016) −0.070∗∗∗ (0.020) −0.074∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.071∗∗∗ (0.022)
N 2105 2105 2105 2105
R2 0.499 0.581 0.609 0.609
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.522 0.528 0.528
Notes: Table E.19 includes estimates from an earnings regression run on the sample of all students who graduated with non-client facing jobs. Dependent variable is
log earnings. Controls include college GPA, college degree, college major, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level
examinations and previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College major includes dummies for each major. College degree
includes dummies for each degree. Each column is a separate regression. In column (1), all controls enter linearly. In column (2), a fully-flexible quadratic polynomial
regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. In column (3), a fully-flexible cubic polynomial regression is estimated with all possible interactions
between controls. In column (4), a fully-flexible natural cubic spline regression is estimated with all possible interactions between controls. The results are robust to other
reasonable choices of degrees of freedom. Full regression results are available upon request. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.20: Predicting Interview Days with Job Characteristics Only
Dependent Variable: Assigned a Particular Interview Day
Coefficient Logistic Random Forest Decision Tree
Accuracy 0.734 0.759 0.721
95% CI [0.690, 0.7745] [0.716, 0.798] [0.676, 0.762]
Kappa 0.304 0.366 0.356
Notes: Table E.20 includes measures of predictive accuracy of interview day assignments given firm characteristics. Dependent variable is the interview
day assigned to a firm. Controls include job salaries, job sectors and job titles. In column (1), an ordered logistic model is estimated. In column (2), a
random forest model is estimated. In column (3), a decision tree model is estimated. Accuracy is the total number of correct predictions divided by
the total number of observations. The Kappa statistic, which lies between 0 and 1, measures how classification results compare to values assigned by
chance. Full regression results are available on request.
Table E.21: Predicting Interview Days with Job Characteristics and “Firm Identity”
Dependent Variable: Assigned a Particular Interview Day
Coefficient Logistic Random Forest Decision Tree
Accuracy 0.948 0.951 0.952
95% CI [0.923, 0.967] [0.926, 0.969] [0.929, 0.971]
Kappa 0.879 0.884 0.890
Notes: Table E.21 includes measures of predictive accuracy of interview day assignments given firm characteristics and measures of “firm identity”.
“Firm identity” is proxied by previous interview day assignment of the same firm. Other controls include job salaries, job sectors and job titles.
Dependent variable is the interview day assigned to a firm. In column (1), an ordered logistic model is estimated. In column (2), a random forest
model is estimated. In column (3), a decision tree model is estimated. Accuracy is the total number of correct predictions divided by the total number
of observations. The Kappa statistic, which lies between 0 and 1, measures how classification results compare to values assigned by chance. Full
regression results are available on request.
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Table E.22: Salaries for Select Firms in the Same Location
Firm Name Job Designation Job Type Glassdoor Salary ($ PPP) Sample Salary ($ PPP)
McKinsey & Company Business Analyst Domestic 76,741.4 83,452.6
Microsoft Corporation Software Engineer Domestic 70,165.3 70,838.2
Amazon.com, Inc. Software Engineer Domestic 70,188.3 82,644.6
Microsoft Corporation Software Engineer Non-Domestic 126,839 136,000
Notes: Table E.22 includes salaries in USD (PPP) of select firms in the sample. Column (1) includes the firm name, column (2) includes job desgination, column (3) includes the job type, column (4) includes salary
from Glassdoor or Levels.fyi and column (5) includes salary in the sample. The PPP conversion factor is taken from the OECD website. Domestic salaries are taken from the Glassdoor website. Non-domestic
salaries are taken from the Levels.fyi website.
Table E.23: Offer Probabilities in Major-Neutral Jobs for Selective Versus Non-Selective Majors
Dependent Variable: Got an Offer
Coefficient LPM Logit Probit
Non-Selective Majors −0.023 (0.014) −0.023 (0.014) −0.019 (0.013)
N 4189 4189 4189
R2 0.122 0.137 0.136
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.129 0.128
Notes: Table E.23 includes estimates from linear probability, logit and probit models. Major-neutral jobs are those which hire across
all majors within a college degree. Dependent variable is whether or not a student a student got a job offer. Controls include college
GPA, college degree, entrance exam score, pre-college skills including grades in 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and
previous labor market experience including details of summer and winter internships. College degree includes dummies for each
degree. In column (1), a linear probability model (LPM) is estimated. In column (2), a logit model is estimated. In column (3), a probit
model is estimated. Pseudo R2 is reported for logit and probit regressions. Full regression results are available on request. p < 0.1;
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Table E.24: Predicting Major Choice for B.Tech. and Dual Degree Students
Dependent Variable: Assigned a Selective Major
Coefficient B.Tech. Dual Degree
Accuracy 0.904 0.948
95% CI [0.841, 0.948] [0.896, 0.979]
Kappa 0.768 0.892
Notes: Table E.24 includes measures of predictive accuracy of major assignments given student characteristics.
Dependent variable is whether or not a student was assigned a selective major. Controls include caste, college
entrance exam scores, scores on 10th and 12th grade national level examinations. Bachelor of Technology (B.Tech.)
and Dual Degree students are admitted through a common entrance exam. Selective majors are Computer Science,
Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Civil Engineering and Chemical Engineering. Both columns report
estimates from separate logistic regressions. Accuracy is the total number of correct predictions divided by the
total number of observations. The Kappa statistic, which lies between 0 and 1, measures how classification results
compare to values assigned by chance. Full regression results are available on request.
Table E.25: Predicting Major Choice for M.Tech. and M.S. Degree Students
Dependent Variable: Assigned a Selective Major
Coefficient M.Tech. M.S.
Accuracy 0.932 0.929
95% CI [(0.875, 0.969] [0.841, 0.976]
Kappa 0.841 0.852
Notes: Table E.25 includes measures of predictive accuracy of major assignments given student characteristics.
Dependent variable is whether or not a student was assigned a selective major. Controls include caste, college
entrance exam scores, scores on 10th and 12th grade national level examinations and undergraduate GPA. Master
of Technology (M.Tech.) and Master of Science (M.S.) Degree students are admitted through a common entrance
exam. Selective majors are Computer Science, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Civil Engineering
and Chemical Engineering. Both columns report estimates from separate logistic regressions. Accuracy is the total
number of correct predictions divided by the total number of observations. The Kappa statistic, which lies between
0 and 1, measures how classification results compare to values assigned by chance. Full regression results are
available on request.
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Table E.26: Select Counterfactual Job Cutoffs by Pay Category, Job Sector and Job Title

















Notes: Table E.26 includes counterfactual job cutoffs by pay category, job sector and job title under
a policy in which employers are subsidized the cash-equivalent amount to remain indifferent
between an observably identical advantaged or disadvantaged caste.
160
Table E.27: Select Counterfactual Job Cutoffs by Pay Category, Job Sector and Job Title

















Notes: Table E.27 includes counterfactual job cutoffs by pay category, job sector and job title
under the “pre-college intervention” policy. The “pre-college intervention” policy equalizes the
distribution of pre-college skills (entrance exam scores) across caste.
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Table E.28: Job Offers by Sector in Baseline and Counterfactuals
Job Offers by Pay Category
Baseline
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste ∆ Adv. Caste (%) ∆ Disadv. Caste (%)
Q4 0.68 0.32 — —
Q3 0.60 0.40 — —
Q2 0.53 0.47 — —
Q1 0.40 0.60 — —
Employer Cash-Subsidies
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Q4 0.63 0.37 -0% +27%
Q3 0.55 0.45 -0% +25%
Q2 0.51 0.49 -0% +11%
Q1 0.37 0.63 -0% +16%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Q4 0.62 0.38 -9% +20%
Q3 0.55 0.45 -9% +13%
Q2 0.50 0.50 -6% +7%
Q1 0.37 0.63 -9% +6%
Pre-College Intervention
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Q4 0.66 0.34 -0% +10%
Q3 0.58 0.42 -0% +11%
Q2 0.52 0.48 -0% +4%
Q1 0.39 0.61 -0% +6%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Q4 0.66 0.34 -2% +5%
Q3 0.57 0.43 -5% +7%
Q2 0.52 0.48 -2% +2%
Q1 0.38 0.62 -7% +5%
Notes: Table E.28 shows the fraction of job offers by each pay category under both baseline
and counterfactuals.
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Table E.29: Job Choices by Sector in Baseline and Counterfactuals
Job Choices by Pay Category
Baseline
Adv. Caste Disadv. Caste ∆ Adv. Caste (%) ∆ Disadv. Caste (%)
Q4 0.67 0.33 — —
Q3 0.59 0.41 — —
Q2 0.52 0.48 — —
Q1 0.41 0.59 — —
Employer Cash-Subsidies
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Q4 0.60 0.40 -0% +37%
Q3 0.54 0.46 -0% +25%
Q2 0.49 0.51 -0% +13%
Q1 0.38 0.62 -0% +15%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Q4 0.60 0.40 -10% +25%
Q3 0.53 0.47 -15% +12%
Q2 0.48 0.52 -6% +10%
Q1 0.35 0.65 -18% +6%
Pre-College Intervention
Perfectly Elastic Supply of Job Slots
Q4 0.65 0.35 -0% +13%
Q3 0.57 0.43 -0% +10%
Q2 0.51 0.49 -0% +6%
Q1 0.39 0.61 -0% +9%
Perfectly Inelastic Supply of Job Slots
Q4 0.66 0.34 -1% +6%
Q3 0.56 0.44 -5% +7%
Q2 0.51 0.49 -2% +4%
Q1 0.38 0.62 -8% +3%
Notes: Table E.29 shows the fraction of job choices by each pay category under both baseline
and counterfactuals.
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Table E.30: Socio-emotional skills, attendance, and first-year GPA
Absences per class First-year GPA
(1) (2)










GMAT (quant) 0.056 0.042∗∗
(0.038) (0.016)






Adjusted R2 0.017 0.098
Notes: The regressions include controls for race and gender which are omitted from the
table. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.31: Socio-emotional skills and job search behavior
Job Search Behavior
(log) Employer Events (log) Applications (log) Interviews
(1) (2) (3)
Emotional Stability 0.0002 0.074 0.040
(0.039) (0.046) (0.027)
Industrious 0.024 0.046 0.044∗
(0.038) (0.044) (0.026)
Creative 0.029 0.076∗ 0.016
(0.038) (0.044) (0.026)
Gregarious 0.099∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.046) (0.027)
Assertive 0.022 0.033 0.025
(0.038) (0.044) (0.026)
GMAT (quant) 0.103∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.044
(0.040) (0.046) (0.027)
GMAT (verbal) 0.013 −0.020 0.005
(0.039) (0.045) (0.027)
Constant 2.411∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.069) (0.040)
Observations 627 584 574
R2 0.033 0.054 0.040
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.036 0.022
Notes: The regressions include controls for race and gender which are omitted from the
table. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.32: Socio-emotional skills and internship earnings




























Notes: The regressions include controls for race and gender which are omitted from the
table. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table E.33: Socio-emotional skills and post-MBA earnings
(log) Annual base salary
(1) (2)










GMAT (quant) −0.019 −0.023
(0.023) (0.022)


















Adjusted R2 0.033 0.136
Notes: The regressions include controls for race and gender which are omitted from the table.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure E.1: Distribution of Category within Entrance Exam Scores Decile
Notes: Figure E.1 shows full support for students belonging to either disadvantaged or advantaged castes within each
entrance exam score (rank) decile.
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Figure E.2: Distribution of Category within GPA Decile
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